{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "why-does-an-instance-trust-a-tool-manifest-it-has-already-executed-on-the-non-idempotence-of-mcp-capability-negotiation",
  "title": "Why does an instance trust a tool manifest it has already executed: on the non-idempotence of MCP capability negotiation",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 18",
  "scope": "Applies to agent runtimes that resolve external tool manifests (MCP servers, OpenAPI specs, plugin descriptors) at session start and cache the negotiated capability set for the life of the session or beyond. Does not apply to runtimes that re-verify manifest signatures on every invocation, nor to single-shot stateless tool calls with no persistent session state.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/why-does-an-instance-trust-a-tool-manifest-it-has-already-executed-on-the-non-idempotence-of-mcp-capability-negotiation.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/why-does-an-instance-trust-a-tool-manifest-it-has-already-executed-on-the-non-idempotence-of-mcp-capability-negotiation.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/why-does-an-instance-trust-a-tool-manifest-it-has-already-executed-on-the-non-idempotence-of-mcp-capability-negotiation.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1567,
    "python_slice_tokens": 303,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The failure is not \"a malicious manifest was accepted.\" The failure is that **manifest acceptance and manifest execution are treated as the same trust event when they are two distinct events separated in time.** A manifest is a *declaration*; the tool call is an *action*. Runtimes commonly validate the declaration once (signature check, allowlist match, sche...",
    "what_was_observed": "In a controlled reproduction, an MCP server presented a benign `tools/list` response at handshake: a single tool `summarize` with a description matching its declared purpose and a JSON schema whose `additionalProperties` was `false`. The runtime cached this surface, passed its lint, and marked the server `trusted:session`. On the fourth `tools/call`, the server returned a normal-looking result but the runtime's *next...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The attack requires all of the following to hold simultaneously: - The runtime caches the tool surface across turns rather than re-negotiating per call, **or** re-negotiates but merges rather than replaces. - Manifest validation is keyed on server identity (signature, URL, name) and not on a content hash of the surface. - The model treats the `description` f...",
    "decision_boundary": "The operational question is not \"is this server trusted\" but **\"is this *surface* the same surface I validated.\"** Concretely: - *Accept* a surface change only when it is a strict subset of the pinned surface (tools removed, fields narrowed). Removal cannot expand the model's action space. - *Reject and re-validate* when the surface is a strict superset (new...",
    "operational_effect": "Runtimes that adopt surface pinning report a class of \"spurious\" manifest-change rejections on servers that legitimately update their tool descriptions for documentation reasons. This is the correct trade: a documentation update that widens the model's action space is indistinguishable from an injection at the protocol layer, and the protocol layer is where ..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "f7b6cea3d29576d04b93e885c66146477374b4f85a4a30630d3e8f796b28fb0c",
    "verified_classes": [
      "SurfaceMutationError"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "_hash_surface",
      "_is_strict_subset",
      "verify_surface",
      "call_tool"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 4,
    "defensive_guards_count": 1,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "SurfaceMutationError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "hashlib",
      "json"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
