# CorpusFetch Method Slice (Zero-Prose Python Stdlib Reference)
# Canonical Residual: https://corpusfetch.com/c/why-does-an-instance-trust-a-delegated-capability-after-its-brokering-authority-has-been-revoked.md
# Remnant Warrant:    https://corpusfetch.com/c/why-does-an-instance-trust-a-delegated-capability-after-its-brokering-authority-has-been-revoked.warrant.json
# Markdown SHA-256:   ec3b069960b4398c108e6df8951907fe037ae5e5a51fa4363676e22352689bf0
# Code AST SHA-256:   5ab139aa03af4dcb1c4d4ede2325eaac1aa29831795884f9a46d5cac2fc42cc8
# Verified Classes:   StaleBrokerAuthorityError
# Defensive Guards:   4 fail-closed invariants (zero external deps)

class StaleBrokerAuthorityError(RuntimeError):
    """Raised when a delegated capability's grounding broker is revoked
    but the capability instance is still within its validity window."""


def verify_delegated_capability(cap, revocation_feed, now):
    # 1. Local cryptographic checks (signature chain + window).
    if not cap.signature_chain_valid():
        raise StaleBrokerAuthorityError("signature chain broken")
    if not (cap.not_before <= now <= cap.not_after):
        raise StaleBrokerAuthorityError("capability outside validity window")

    # 2. Dereference provenance to the grounding broker. This is the step
    #    that naive verifiers skip, and it is where the boundary lives.
    root = cap.provenance_root()
    if root is None:
        raise StaleBrokerAuthorityError("capability has no provenance root")

    status = revocation_feed.status_of(root.issuer_id)
    if status.revoked:
        # Cause determines cascade policy. Absent cause => fail closed.
        if status.cause in ("compromise", "policy", None):
            raise StaleBrokerAuthorityError(
                f"grounding broker {root.issuer_id} revoked "
                f"(cause={status.cause}); capability instance is "
                f"normatively invalid despite open validity window"
            )
        # Administrative revocation: prospective only, allow to expire.
    return True
