{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "why-does-an-instance-of-a-federated-agent-trust-graph-fail-open-when-a-manifest-s-issuer-field-is-co-signed-by-a-delegated-authority-that-itself-has-n",
  "title": "Why does an instance of a federated agent trust graph fail open when a manifest's `issuer` field is co-signed by a delegated authority that itself has no revocation channel",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 8",
  "scope": "Applies to cross-org agent trust federation systems where agent manifests are signed (e.g., JWS/VC-style), issuer chains may include delegated signing authorities, and revocation is propagated via CRL/OCSP-like channels keyed by issuer DID. Does not apply to single-org PKI with a single root and no delegation, nor to systems that bind revocation to the leaf credential's subject rather than to the signing authority.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/why-does-an-instance-of-a-federated-agent-trust-graph-fail-open-when-a-manifest-s-issuer-field-is-co-signed-by-a-delegated-authority-that-itself-has-n.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/why-does-an-instance-of-a-federated-agent-trust-graph-fail-open-when-a-manifest-s-issuer-field-is-co-signed-by-a-delegated-authority-that-itself-has-n.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/why-does-an-instance-of-a-federated-agent-trust-graph-fail-open-when-a-manifest-s-issuer-field-is-co-signed-by-a-delegated-authority-that-itself-has-n.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 2035,
    "python_slice_tokens": 460,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The distinction that matters here is between **credential validity** (the manifest's signature verifies against a key that chains to a trusted root) and **credential liveness** (the signing authority's authority to sign is itself still current). In a federated agent trust graph, these are routinely conflated because the verification path terminates at a sign...",
    "what_was_observed": "During a federation incident on 2026-11-09, an agent `did:web:agent.acme.example:procurement-7` presented manifests signed by a delegated authority `did:web:trust.acme.example:delegated-signer-2`. The delegated signer's key had been revoked at 14:02 UTC after a key-compromise disclosure. The revocation was published correctly to Acme's CRL endpoint and mirrored to the federation's revocation aggregator. Between 14:02...",
    "condition_of_validity": "This failure requires the conjunction of four conditions. Remove any one and the system fails closed (correctly) or fails loudly: 1. **Delegation is present.** The manifest is signed by an authority that is not the root, and the delegation edge is validated structurally but not temporally. 2. **Revocation is keyed to the subject, not the authority.** The ver...",
    "decision_boundary": "The decision boundary for the operator is not \"should we trust delegated authorities\" — that is a policy question settled at federation onboarding. The boundary is **at what layer revocation is enforced**: - **Enforce at the leaf (wrong):** query revocation for `manifest.issuer`. Cheap, cache-friendly, and blind to delegated-authority compromise. This is the...",
    "operational_effect": "The operational effect of getting this wrong is a **silent, bounded-duration trust violation** whose duration is `min(CRL propagation delay + cache TTL, delegation cert notAfter)`. In the observed incident that was 3h38m. In a worst-case configuration (90-day delegation cert, no forced re-resolution) the exposure window is the full delegation lifetime, and n..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "888a27f6df939ff6ee0d05381ae301632b13c4ff1a169615023d48e0dfaa26c0",
    "verified_classes": [
      "DelegatedAuthorityRevocationGap",
      "SigningChain",
      "RevocationOracle"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "verify_manifest",
      "admit",
      "is_revoked"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 3,
    "defensive_guards_count": 3,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "DelegatedAuthorityRevocationGap"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "dataclasses",
      "time",
      "typing"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}