{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "why-does-an-instance-of-a-federated-agent-accept-a-peer-s-delegated-authority-after-the-brokering-token-has-expired-and-what-invariant-actually-preven",
  "title": "Why does an instance of a federated agent accept a peer's delegated authority after the brokering token has expired — and what invariant actually prevents this?",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 17",
  "scope": "Applies to cross-organization agent federation where authority is conveyed as a chain of signed delegation tokens (capability tokens, macaroons, or biscuit-style attenuable tokens) brokered through a trust-broker that exchanges one org's policy assertion for another's. Does not apply to single-tenant deployments or to federation where the peer's authority is re-derived per-request from a live policy decision point (PDP) lookup rather than carried in a token.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/why-does-an-instance-of-a-federated-agent-accept-a-peer-s-delegated-authority-after-the-brokering-token-has-expired-and-what-invariant-actually-preven.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/why-does-an-instance-of-a-federated-agent-accept-a-peer-s-delegated-authority-after-the-brokering-token-has-expired-and-what-invariant-actually-preven.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/why-does-an-instance-of-a-federated-agent-accept-a-peer-s-delegated-authority-after-the-brokering-token-has-expired-and-what-invariant-actually-preven.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 2080,
    "python_slice_tokens": 367,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The failure is routinely misclassified as a *clock skew* problem or a *token revocation* problem. It is neither. It is a **validation-scope boundary** problem: the verifier validates the cryptographic chain of the delegation token (signatures, issuer, audience, attenuation) but validates the *brokering assertion* — the statement \"org B's broker attests that ...",
    "what_was_observed": "In a three-party federation (Org A = principal's home, Org B = broker, Org C = resource owner), the following sequence reproduced reliably: - At `t0`, Org A mints a delegation token `D` for agent `X` with `exp = t0 + 24h`, attenuating authority to `read:dataset-7`. - At `t0`, Org B's broker issues assertion `A_B` mapping `(A, X) → (C, read:dataset-7)` with validity `[t0, t0 + 1h]`. The broker's policy is to re-assert...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The invariant holds — i.e., the verifier is safe — only when **all** of the following are true at request time: - The delegation token's `exp` is in the future. - The brokering assertion's `not_after` is in the future, checked *at request time*, not at mint time. - The brokering assertion's `issued_at` is within the relying party's configured maximum asserti...",
    "decision_boundary": "The boundary between \"delegation is live\" and \"delegation is a zombie\" is a single comparison, and the correct side is determined by **which clock the relying party trusts for the assertion's lapse**: - If the relying party trusts the *broker's* `not_after` field, it must evaluate it at request time. A broker that cannot be reached to re-assert is a broker w...",
    "operational_effect": "The practical consequence is that **federation liveness and federation safety are decoupled by the broker's re-assertion cadence**, and operators routinely tune the cadence for liveness (fewer round-trips, higher availability) without recognizing that each skipped re-assertion widens the zombie window for every already-minted delegation. The correct operatio..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "c1665fbddfb8c6ac14924ee85de662177995cb702ac78e46688504bc4ae2d5e5",
    "verified_classes": [
      "ZombieDelegationError",
      "BrokeringAssertion",
      "DelegationToken"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "effective_not_after",
      "verify_federated_request",
      "_assertion_scope"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 3,
    "defensive_guards_count": 6,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "ZombieDelegationError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [
      "delegation token is not bound to the presented brokering assertion",
      "brokering assertion references a policy mapping the relying party no longer holds",
      "delegation widens authority beyond the brokering assertion"
    ],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "__future__",
      "dataclasses",
      "time"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
