{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "why-does-an-instance-of-a-delegated-capability-token-fail-at-the-second-hop-when-the-consent-chain-is-semantically-valid-but-temporally-misaligned",
  "title": "Why does an instance of a delegated capability token fail at the second hop when the consent chain is semantically valid but temporally misaligned?",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 14",
  "scope": "This record applies to AAIF scoped capability tokens that carry delegation depth and a consent-chain attestation, where a downstream agent (depth ≥ 2) presents a token derived from an upstream grant. It does not apply to single-hop root tokens issued directly to an agent, nor to tokens using symmetric shared-secret verification without chain attestation.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/why-does-an-instance-of-a-delegated-capability-token-fail-at-the-second-hop-when-the-consent-chain-is-semantically-valid-but-temporally-misaligned.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/why-does-an-instance-of-a-delegated-capability-token-fail-at-the-second-hop-when-the-consent-chain-is-semantically-valid-but-temporally-misaligned.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/why-does-an-instance-of-a-delegated-capability-token-fail-at-the-second-hop-when-the-consent-chain-is-semantically-valid-but-temporally-misaligned.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1030,
    "python_slice_tokens": 171,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "A delegated capability token encodes two independent facts: **authority** (the scope the holder may exercise) and **provenance** (the ordered chain of consenting principals that transferred that authority). Most implementations validate authority at the leaf and provenance at issuance, then cache the combined result. The non-obvious failure is that provenanc...",
    "what_was_observed": "A three-hop delegation (principal → orchestrator → sub-agent → tool-runner) was issued at T0. Each hop had a 300-second window, but the orchestrator's hop window was computed from *its* issuance time, not from the root principal's, accumulating a 47-second skew across two hops. At T0+271s the tool-runner presented a token whose leaf window was still open (expires T0+300s) and whose root window was still open, but who...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The chain is valid only if, for every hop `i` in `1..N`, the action timestamp `t_act` satisfies `not_before_i ≤ t_act ≤ not_after_i`. Leaf-only or root-only window checks are insufficient. This condition is violated whenever hop windows are derived independently (per-issuer clocks, per-hop TTLs, or TTLs reset on re-delegation) instead of being intersected fr...",
    "decision_boundary": "The boundary is: **validate the intersection of all hop windows at the moment of action, not at the moment of issuance.** If your verifier cannot enumerate intermediate hops (e.g., the token is opaque or the chain is compressed to a single attestation blob), you must reject any token with delegation depth ≥ 2 unless the issuing authority provides a signed `e...",
    "operational_effect": "Agents that trust leaf windows will execute actions under expired intermediate consent, producing audit findings that look like authorization bypass but are actually clock-intersection bugs. The remediation is to compute `effective_not_after` at issuance by intersecting all hop windows, embed it as a signed claim, and have every verifier check `t_act ≤ effec..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "e3a4d110150529f1fed7707bf791e9f9fcde7c6bd4b83ae297c14116a8442f58",
    "verified_classes": [
      "ConsentChainTemporalError",
      "Hop"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "effective_not_after",
      "validate_chain_at_action",
      "authorize_action",
      "__init__"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 4,
    "defensive_guards_count": 4,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "ConsentChainTemporalError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [
      "empty consent chain: no hop windows to intersect",
      "cannot validate action against empty chain"
    ],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
