{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "why-does-an-instance-fail-federated-agent-identity-attestation-when-its-hardware-backed-key-rotates-mid-session",
  "title": "Why does an instance fail federated agent identity attestation when its hardware-backed key rotates mid-session",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 15",
  "scope": "Applies to federated agent identity schemes where a long-lived verifiable credential (VC) binds an agent's stable identity to a hardware-backed key (TPM/SE/secure enclave) whose public half is embedded in the credential's `credentialSubject`, and where the key may be rotated or re-provisioned by the platform independently of the credential's lifecycle. Does not apply to short-lived credentials re-issued per session, nor to pure software-key deployments where rotation is coordinated by the identity issuer.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/why-does-an-instance-fail-federated-agent-identity-attestation-when-its-hardware-backed-key-rotates-mid-session.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/why-does-an-instance-fail-federated-agent-identity-attestation-when-its-hardware-backed-key-rotates-mid-session.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/why-does-an-instance-fail-federated-agent-identity-attestation-when-its-hardware-backed-key-rotates-mid-session.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1536,
    "python_slice_tokens": 272,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The distinction that matters is between **key possession** and **credential validity**. A verifiable credential is a signed assertion that \"subject S controls key K.\" Hardware attestation proves \"this runtime controls key K.\" Both can be true simultaneously and independently, yet the *binding* between them can be broken by a key rotation that neither party c...",
    "what_was_observed": "An agent process held a federated VC issued 30 days prior, with `credentialSubject.publicKeyMultibase` set to the base64url of a P-256 key sealed in the platform TPM (EK-derived, `tpm2-tss`-backed). The platform's key-management daemon rotated the sealing key at day 28 as part of a firmware update, re-wrapping the credential-signing key under a new parent and re-generating the leaf keypair. The agent's in-memory hand...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The invariant holds only under the following conjunction: 1. The VC embeds the *leaf* public key, not a stable identifier resolved through a directory (e.g., a DID with a `keyAgreement`/`authentication` verification method that can be updated). If the credential references a DID document, rotation is legal and the verifier MUST resolve the current key set ra...",
    "decision_boundary": "The operational decision is: **on key-rotation detection, re-issue or reject—never re-bind.** Re-binding (accepting the new key against the old VC) transfers the issuer's attestation to a key the issuer never saw, which defeats the purpose of federated attestation. Rejection is safe but operationally noisy; it must be distinguishable from compromise. The bou...",
    "operational_effect": "Agents that do not handle rotation explicitly exhibit one of two failure signatures under load: a thundering herd of re-authentication attempts when a fleet-wide firmware rotation lands (every agent's VC suddenly mismatches), or silent identity drift where agents continue operating under stale attestations until the credential expires. The former is a availa..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "f88a2349e726f0c128ecb30a4d392965e3620aa9e008e8d15ed3d6dd3a831991",
    "verified_classes": [
      "KeyRotationUnattestedError"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "verify_federated_presentation"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 1,
    "defensive_guards_count": 4,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "KeyRotationUnattestedError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [
      "VC signature invalid against issuer trust anchor",
      "attestation quote does not chain to endorsement root",
      "rotation proof present but does not cover this subject/key pair"
    ],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
