{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "why-does-an-instance-accept-a-revoked-mcp-tool-manifest-when-the-revocation-is-signed-after-the-manifest-s-not-after-but-before-the-client-s-clock-ske",
  "title": "Why does an instance accept a revoked MCP tool manifest when the revocation is signed after the manifest's `not_after` but before the client's clock skew window closes?",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 16",
  "scope": "Applies to MCP (Model Context Protocol) server trust where tool manifests are signed with an embedded `not_after` and revocations are distributed as separately signed statements keyed by `(server_id, manifest_digest)`. Does not apply to deployments using a single monotonic transparency-log sequence with no independent revocation channel, nor to clients that pin a manifest digest out-of-band.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/why-does-an-instance-accept-a-revoked-mcp-tool-manifest-when-the-revocation-is-signed-after-the-manifest-s-not-after-but-before-the-client-s-clock-ske.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/why-does-an-instance-accept-a-revoked-mcp-tool-manifest-when-the-revocation-is-signed-after-the-manifest-s-not-after-but-before-the-client-s-clock-ske.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/why-does-an-instance-accept-a-revoked-mcp-tool-manifest-when-the-revocation-is-signed-after-the-manifest-s-not-after-but-before-the-client-s-clock-ske.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1601,
    "python_slice_tokens": 314,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "A signed manifest asserts *authorship and validity-at-signing time*. A signed revocation asserts *withdrawal of trust at revocation time*. These are two distinct temporal predicates evaluated against two distinct clocks. The failure is not \"revocation was ignored\" and not \"signature was invalid.\" It is that the client evaluated the revocation predicate again...",
    "what_was_observed": "A tool-serving fleet ran MCP servers whose manifests carried `not_after = T + 24h` and were re-signed hourly. A compromised signing key was discovered at `T + 25h`; a revocation statement `R` was published at `T + 25h + 3m`, signed by the root key, carrying `revoked_at = T + 25h + 3m` and `manifest_digest = D`. Clients behaved in three classes: - Class A (re-check on every invocation): rejected the tool. Correct. - C...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The correct predicate is: with the additional requirement that `revoked(digest, now)` is evaluated over *all* revocation statements whose `revoked_at <= now`, regardless of relationship to `m.not_after`. A revocation with `revoked_at > m.not_after` is still binding for any executable copy of `m`, because the copy is being executed *now*, after `revoked_at`. ...",
    "decision_boundary": "The boundary is: **does the client consult the revocation set on the execution path, or only on the admission path?** - If revocation is checked only at admission (manifest fetch/verify), then any manifest admitted before revocation and kept executable is a violation. - If revocation is checked on the execution path, the check must not be short-circuited by ...",
    "operational_effect": "Clients in Class B and Class C executed a tool signed by a compromised key for 3–9 hours after a valid, correctly signed revocation existed. The revocation was not lost, not forged, and not expired — it was *temporally misclassified* because the client conflated \"manifest no longer valid for refresh\" with \"manifest no longer subject to revocation.\" The fix i..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "ae2e52896299a6f3ac828991f6dbf6a168068ba369b960ea19545e08ee57cef0",
    "verified_classes": [
      "RevocationBypassError",
      "Manifest",
      "Revocation",
      "ToolTrustStore"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "invoke",
      "__init__",
      "admit",
      "revoke",
      "is_executable",
      "authorize"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 6,
    "defensive_guards_count": 4,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "RevocationBypassError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "__future__",
      "dataclasses",
      "time"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
