# CorpusFetch Method Slice (Zero-Prose Python Stdlib Reference)
# Canonical Residual: https://corpusfetch.com/c/which-invariants-prevent-taint-laundering-in-mcp-tool-sandboxes-when-a-single-server-multiplexes-trusted-and-untrusted-tool-results.md
# Remnant Warrant:    https://corpusfetch.com/c/which-invariants-prevent-taint-laundering-in-mcp-tool-sandboxes-when-a-single-server-multiplexes-trusted-and-untrusted-tool-results.warrant.json
# Markdown SHA-256:   fd7998051be6b4aa9b5a11c2702d557caa072c09dd93f741364215cd1d5f992c
# Code AST SHA-256:   a3e98ad116b4dd1fb47cf0eac26bf9a77966cac4458519b73d5103f4268586e6
# Verified Classes:   TaintLaunderingError, Label
# Defensive Guards:   1 fail-closed invariants (zero external deps)

class TaintLaunderingError(RuntimeError):
    """Raised when an untrusted datum reaches a privileged sink without declassification."""
    pass


class Label:
    TRUSTED = "TRUSTED"
    UNTRUSTED = "UNTRUSTED"

    @staticmethod
    def join(*labels: str) -> str:
        return Label.UNTRUSTED if Label.UNTRUSTED in labels else Label.TRUSTED


# Tools that may legitimately lower taint. Free-text transformers are NOT here.
DECLASSIFIERS = frozenset({"is_valid_path", "count_bytes", "enum_status"})


def propagate_output_label(tool_name: str, input_labels: list[str]) -> str:
    """Output label = union of inputs, unless tool is an explicit declassifier."""
    if tool_name in DECLASSIFIERS:
        return Label.TRUSTED
    return Label.join(*input_labels)


def invoke_sink(tool_name: str, args: dict[str, tuple[str, str]], declass_token: str | None):
    """args maps arg_name -> (value, label). Sink re-checks at the boundary."""
    for arg_name, (value, label) in args.items():
        if label == Label.UNTRUSTED and declass_token is None:
            raise TaintLaunderingError(
                f"sink {tool_name!r} rejected argument {arg_name!r}: "
                f"UNTRUSTED taint reached privileged sink without declassification token"
            )
    # ... perform the privileged action ...
    return {"ok": True, "tool": tool_name}


def build_summarize_flow():
    # read_url is a source: UNTRUSTED by default.
    url_body = ("attacker payload", Label.UNTRUSTED)
    # summarize is a passthrough, NOT a declassifier: output inherits UNTRUSTED.
    summary_label = propagate_output_label("summarize", [url_body[1]])
    summary = ("paraphrased attacker payload", summary_label)
    # write_file is a sink: must reject.
    return invoke_sink("write_file", {"path": ("/etc/cron.d/x", summary[1])}, declass_token=None)


if __name__ == "__main__":
    try:
        build_summarize_flow()
    except TaintLaunderingError as e:
        print(f"blocked as expected: {e}")
