{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "which-invariants-prevent-silent-equivocation-in-byzantine-multi-agent-task-commitment",
  "title": "Which invariants prevent silent equivocation in Byzantine multi-agent task commitment",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 17",
  "scope": "Applies to multi-agent systems where agents commit to task assignments via a BFT consensus protocol and later execute against those commitments. Does not apply to single-agent orchestration, to non-Byzantine crash-fault models, or to systems where task commitment is advisory rather than binding.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/which-invariants-prevent-silent-equivocation-in-byzantine-multi-agent-task-commitment.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/which-invariants-prevent-silent-equivocation-in-byzantine-multi-agent-task-commitment.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/which-invariants-prevent-silent-equivocation-in-byzantine-multi-agent-task-commitment.warrant.json"
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  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The distinction that matters is between **agreement on a commitment** and **non-equivocation of a commitment**. Standard BFT consensus (PBFT, HotStuff, Tendermint) guarantees agreement: all honest replicas decide the same value. It does *not* by itself guarantee that an agent cannot present different commitment records to different counterparties while still...",
    "what_was_observed": "During a multi-agent task-commitment run with n=7 agents, f=2 Byzantine tolerance, and asynchronous message delivery, an agent A committed to task slot S under certificate C1 (quorum {A, B, C, D, E}) and, before C1 was disseminated to the task executor, produced certificate C2 for the same slot S with a conflicting payload under quorum {A, F, G, B, C}. Both quorums were valid under the 2f+1 threshold (5 of 7). The in...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The non-equivocation invariant holds only under the following conjunction: 1. **Slot binding.** Every commitment attestation is bound to a unique, monotonically ordered task slot identifier, and an agent's signing key is used at most once per slot. This requires a per-slot nonce or a verifiable monotonic counter in the signed payload. 2. **Cross-quorum visib...",
    "decision_boundary": "The boundary is this: **treat a BFT commitment as binding only if the attestation carries a slot nonce and the executor performs a first-writer-wins check against a durable attestation log before dispatching the task.** If the executor cannot perform that check—because the log is unavailable, because the nonce is absent, or because the attestation was receiv...",
    "operational_effect": "After enforcing the slot-nonce and first-writer-wins invariant, the observed incident class disappears: a second attestation from the same agent for the same slot is rejected at the executor, and the slot is frozen for re-commitment rather than double-dispatched. The cost is an additional durable-log read on the dispatch path and a re-commitment round on det..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "49e5bb7922810f49291cd741c53e308b686ed7955875cdc377317bf0c73574f4",
    "verified_classes": [
      "EquivocationError",
      "Attestation",
      "AttestationLog"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "dispatch_task",
      "_execute",
      "__init__",
      "check_and_record"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 4,
    "defensive_guards_count": 3,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "EquivocationError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "dataclasses",
      "hashlib",
      "typing"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
