{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "which-invariants-prevent-signed-agent-card-trust-from-being-silently-downgraded-during-a2a-v1-0-task-lifecycle-renegotiation",
  "title": "Which invariants prevent signed Agent Card trust from being silently downgraded during A2A v1.0 task lifecycle renegotiation",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 18",
  "scope": "Applies to A2A v1.0 orchestrators that discover remote agents via signed Agent Cards and subsequently negotiate task lifecycle state transitions (`submitted` → `working` → `input-required` → `completed`/`failed`/`canceled`) across a trust boundary. Does not apply to intra-mesh agents sharing a single signing authority, nor to A2A v0.x, where the Agent Card carried no verifiable signature and trust was established out-of-band.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/which-invariants-prevent-signed-agent-card-trust-from-being-silently-downgraded-during-a2a-v1-0-task-lifecycle-renegotiation.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/which-invariants-prevent-signed-agent-card-trust-from-being-silently-downgraded-during-a2a-v1-0-task-lifecycle-renegotiation.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/which-invariants-prevent-signed-agent-card-trust-from-being-silently-downgraded-during-a2a-v1-0-task-lifecycle-renegotiation.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1433,
    "python_slice_tokens": 229,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "A signed Agent Card authenticates **the advertised capability envelope at discovery time**; it does not authenticate the **task lifecycle transitions negotiated afterward**. A2A v1.0 permits a remote agent to return `input-required` mid-task and to attach a *revised* card or capability descriptor with that transition. The signing invariant protects the bindi...",
    "what_was_observed": "In a federated deployment (orchestrator O, agent A reached through a gateway G that terminates TLS and re-signs cards on behalf of a sub-fleet), the following sequence reproduced reliably: 1. O discovers A, fetches the Agent Card, verifies the detached JWS against A's published `jwks_uri` rooted at a trusted CA. Verification passes. O records `trust_level=verified`, `issuer=A`, and caches the card keyed by `(agent_id...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The downgrade is possible only when all of the following hold simultaneously: - The card update is accepted on a lifecycle edge (`input-required`, `working` heartbeat with capability refresh) rather than requiring a fresh out-of-band discovery. - Signature verification checks *chain validity* but not *issuer continuity* — i.e., the verifier confirms \"signed ...",
    "decision_boundary": "The boundary is not \"is the update signed?\" but \"**is the update signed by the principal the task was admitted under, and is that fact recorded as a lifecycle event?**\" Two invariants must hold together; either alone is insufficient: - **Issuer-continuity invariant:** For the lifetime of a task, every card update must verify against the *same* issuer key set...",
    "operational_effect": "When these invariants are enforced, the observable behavior changes in three ways: (1) delegated-issuer deployments must pre-declare delegation in the signed card, converting a silent substitution into an explicit, auditable grant; (2) capability widening during a task becomes impossible without a new task ID, which makes the audit trail linear and replayabl..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "1eefa966bda63b4556f9f3362cfcfecf6ab0eb5e83bdc24df793ca08ccb33dfe",
    "verified_classes": [
      "TrustAnchorSubstitutionError",
      "CapabilityWideningError"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "apply_card_update"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 1,
    "defensive_guards_count": 2,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "CapabilityWideningError",
      "TrustAnchorSubstitutionError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
