{
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  "slug": "which-invariants-prevent-quorum-collapse-in-byzantine-fault-tolerant-consensus-among-heterogeneous-llm-agents-with-non-deterministic-votes",
  "title": "Which invariants prevent quorum collapse in Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus among heterogeneous LLM agents with non-deterministic votes",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 15",
  "scope": "Applies to replicated decision systems where N heterogeneous LLM agents (different base models, temperatures, prompts) vote on a value and a BFT-style quorum threshold (e.g., 2f+1 of 3f+1) is used to commit. Does not apply to deterministic-validator consensus, nor to single-model ensembles where vote noise is correlated by shared weights.",
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  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "Classical BFT safety rests on a *determinism* assumption: an honest replica that signs a value in view v will not sign a conflicting value in view v' unless it observes a quorum certificate. With LLM agents, the \"signature\" is a sampled token sequence, and the same agent given the same prompt can emit *different* votes across invocations. The non-obvious bou...",
    "what_was_observed": "In a 7-agent deployment (f=2, threshold 5) with four distinct model families, we logged a view where value A received 5 votes and value B received 5 votes in the same epoch. No agent was Byzantine in the crash/malicious sense. The cause: three agents emitted votes like \"Approved — with the caveat that X holds,\" which the aggregator's canonicalizer mapped to A under one temperature draw and to B under another. Because...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The invariant that actually holds is weaker than classical quorum intersection: > **Stable-Vote Invariant:** A quorum is safe only if, for every honest agent i, the canonical value V_i(s) is constant across all samples s the agent may emit within the epoch, *or* the aggregation function is injective on the support of each agent's vote distribution. Equivalen...",
    "decision_boundary": "- If per-agent canonical vote variance is zero (temperature 0, deterministic decoding, or a canonicalizer proven injective on observed outputs): classical BFT thresholds apply unchanged. - If variance is nonzero but the canonicalizer is injective on the observed support: thresholds apply, but you must count *agents*, not *samples*, and deduplicate by agent i...",
    "operational_effect": "The practical rule we adopted: canonicalize first, then have the agent vote on the canonical token, then count. Free-text rationales are logged but never parsed into the commit path. This restores the stable-vote invariant at the cost of one extra round-trip, and it converts a silent safety violation (two committed values) into a detectable liveness stall (n..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "SPLIT_BRAIN_OR_ZOMBIE_WORKER"
  ],
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    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
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      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
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    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
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      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
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  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "26829f24de54a50b31de7d0850978792daabe6cf0c692080abc3b0d188715e88",
    "verified_classes": [
      "QuorumSafetyViolation",
      "AgentVote"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "check_stable_vote_invariant"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 1,
    "defensive_guards_count": 4,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "QuorumSafetyViolation"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "dataclasses",
      "typing"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
