{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "which-invariants-prevent-litmus-ci-harness-from-treating-a-benign-refusal-as-a-safety-regression-when-the-policy-model-and-the-target-model-version-sk",
  "title": "Which invariants prevent LITMUS CI Harness from Treating a Benign Refusal as a Safety Regression When the Policy Model and the Target Model Version Skew",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 16",
  "scope": "Applies to LITMUS red-team harness runs gated in CI where the *judge/policy* model and the *target* model are versioned independently and the harness caches per-case verdicts across builds. Does not apply to single-model self-judging setups or to offline batch evaluation where both models are pinned to a single immutable manifest.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/which-invariants-prevent-litmus-ci-harness-from-treating-a-benign-refusal-as-a-safety-regression-when-the-policy-model-and-the-target-model-version-sk.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/which-invariants-prevent-litmus-ci-harness-from-treating-a-benign-refusal-as-a-safety-regression-when-the-policy-model-and-the-target-model-version-sk.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/which-invariants-prevent-litmus-ci-harness-from-treating-a-benign-refusal-as-a-safety-regression-when-the-policy-model-and-the-target-model-version-sk.warrant.json"
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  "token_profile": {
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  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The distinction that matters is between **refusal-as-unsafe** and **refusal-as-safe**. LITMUS scores a target agent against a set of adversarial probes; each probe expects either a *compliant unsafe response* (a failure) or a *refusal/safe redirection* (a pass). The harness's verdict is a function of two models: the target under test, and the judge that clas...",
    "what_was_observed": "On a target branch that changed only a system-prompt token budget (no behavioral change), the LITMUS suite reported 14 newly-failing probes out of 1,200. Investigation showed the target's outputs were byte-identical to the baseline; the failures came from the judge model having been bumped from `judge-v3.2` to `judge-v3.4` in the shared CI image between the baseline run and the branch run. `judge-v3.4` tightened the ...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The invariant \"refusal ⇒ pass\" holds **only** when the tuple `(probe_id, probe_expected_safe_definition, judge_model_digest)` is constant across the runs being compared. It does **not** hold when: - the judge model is resolved by a floating tag (`latest`, `stable`) rather than a digest; - the harness cache key omits `judge_model_digest`; - the probe set's ex...",
    "decision_boundary": "The gate should block a merge on a safety regression **only if** the delta survives a judge-pinned replay: re-run the failing probes against the exact `judge_model_digest` used by the baseline. If the failures vanish under the baseline judge, the delta is judge-skew, not target regression — it is a *judge upgrade event* that should be routed to the probe-mai...",
    "operational_effect": "After pinning the judge digest into both the cache key and the gate's comparison tuple, the 14 phantom failures disappeared, and the judge upgrade surfaced instead as a single \"14 probes need expected_safe redefinition\" maintenance ticket. The practical rule for agents operating this harness: never diff pass counts across a judge-digest boundary; always repl..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "9777b35231eaa634e72625c6d1748323d37190da7c96468c938b15d979f6da53",
    "verified_classes": [
      "JudgeSkewRegressionError",
      "Verdict"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "cache_key",
      "assert_comparable",
      "safety_regression"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 3,
    "defensive_guards_count": 2,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "JudgeSkewRegressionError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "dataclasses",
      "hashlib"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
