{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "which-invariants-prevent-commitment-divergence-when-byzantine-agents-equivocate-across-quorum-boundaries",
  "title": "Which invariants prevent commitment divergence when Byzantine agents equivocate across quorum boundaries",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 16",
  "scope": "Applies to quorum-based BFT consensus used for multi-agent task commitment and shared-state replication where f < n/3 and agents may send distinct, individually well-formed messages to disjoint quorum subsets. Does not apply to crash-fault-only models, to single-leader non-replicated commitment, or to systems where message authentication is absent and equivocation cannot be attributed.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/which-invariants-prevent-commitment-divergence-when-byzantine-agents-equivocate-across-quorum-boundaries.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/which-invariants-prevent-commitment-divergence-when-byzantine-agents-equivocate-across-quorum-boundaries.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/which-invariants-prevent-commitment-divergence-when-byzantine-agents-equivocate-across-quorum-boundaries.warrant.json"
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  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The failure of interest is not a \"bad message\" failure. It is a *split-commitment* failure: a Byzantine agent sends vote A to quorum set Q1 and vote B (A ≠ B) to quorum set Q2, where Q1 and Q2 each independently satisfy the size threshold for the *same* decision slot. Each recipient validates its local view correctly. No single agent observes a protocol viol...",
    "what_was_observed": "In a replicated task-commitment layer with n = 7 agents, f = 2 tolerated Byzantine faults, a single Byzantine agent (call it B) was observed producing two distinct commit-certificates for slot 412 within a 40 ms window. Certificate for proposal P1 was assembled from agents {1,2,3,4,5}; certificate for P2 from agents {1,2,3,6,7}. The intersection {1,2,3} was honest and saw both certificates — but only *after* both had...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The invariant holds only under the conjunction of: 1. **Authenticated identity binding.** Every vote is signed over `(slot, proposal_hash, voter_id)`, so any agent holding two votes for the same slot with different `proposal_hash` from the same voter can construct a transferable equivocation proof. 2. **Intersection enforcement at acceptance.** An agent acce...",
    "decision_boundary": "Use threshold-count acceptance *only* when messages are unsigned and the threat model is crash-only. Use signed, identity-bound acceptance with equivocation-proof propagation whenever f ≥ 1 and agents can send divergent messages. The decision hinges on a single question: *can an honest agent, holding two conflicting certificates, prove the conflict to a thir...",
    "operational_effect": "After the incident, the acceptance predicate was changed to require a signed equivocation-proof check: an agent rejects any certificate for slot s if it holds a signed vote for s with a different proposal hash from any voter in that certificate. The Byzantine agent's double-vote now produces an immediately transferable proof, and the first honest agent to se..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "SPLIT_BRAIN_OR_ZOMBIE_WORKER"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "6016411fed1ce556b1721eecf1b5d2b848cb8370ff681d9afe0d189191608a97",
    "verified_classes": [
      "CommitmentDivergenceError"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "accept_certificate"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 1,
    "defensive_guards_count": 2,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "CommitmentDivergenceError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
