{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "where-must-an-instance-refuse-to-trust-agent-card-discovery-in-a2a-v1-0-signed-task-delegation",
  "title": "Where must an instance refuse to trust Agent Card discovery in A2A v1.0 signed task delegation",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 17",
  "scope": "Applies to A2A v1.0 peers that fetch an Agent Card from a remote origin and subsequently accept signed task delegation envelopes whose `issuer` claim is bound to that card's `id`/`publicKey`. Does not apply to purely local agent registries, nor to A2A v0.x where the card was unsigned and delegation was bearer-token based.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/where-must-an-instance-refuse-to-trust-agent-card-discovery-in-a2a-v1-0-signed-task-delegation.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/where-must-an-instance-refuse-to-trust-agent-card-discovery-in-a2a-v1-0-signed-task-delegation.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/where-must-an-instance-refuse-to-trust-agent-card-discovery-in-a2a-v1-0-signed-task-delegation.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1422,
    "python_slice_tokens": 198,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The distinction that matters is between **card provenance** and **card authority**. A2A v1.0 lets an instance discover a card at a well-known URI (`/.well-known/agent-card.json`), and separately lets a peer present a signed envelope (`JWS` over a canonicalized task payload) whose `issuer` is asserted to correspond to that card. These are two distinct trust e...",
    "what_was_observed": "In a controlled deployment (two A2A v1.0 orchestrators, one worker pool, TLS on all legs), we observed the following sequence accepted without error: 1. Orchestrator A resolves `worker.example` and fetches its card from `https://worker.example/.well-known/agent-card.json`. Card `id = \"worker-7f3a\"`, key thumbprint `T1`. 2. Orchestrator A caches the card with a TTL of 900s, keyed on `agent id` only — **not** on `(id, ...",
    "condition_of_validity": "Trusting a delegation envelope is only sound when all of the following hold simultaneously: - The card used to verify the envelope was fetched from an origin that is **cryptographically bound into the envelope**, e.g. the `iss` includes the origin, or the envelope carries a `card_digest` (hash of the exact card bytes) that the verifier recomputes against a f...",
    "decision_boundary": "The decision rule an instance must apply: - **Accept** the envelope only if `card_digest` recomputes correctly against a card fetched from the origin named in the envelope's authenticated transport, *and* the `iss`/`kid`/thumbprint all match that exact card. - **Reject and quarantine** if the card is served from cache and the cache entry lacks an origin comp...",
    "operational_effect": "After enforcing origin-bound card digests and `(id, origin, digest)` cache keys, the observed effect was: - Stale staging cards could no longer shadow production cards; the failover drill that had produced the 11-minute window now fails closed within one envelope. - Legitimate key rotation required a card re-fetch (one extra RTT per rotation), which we accep..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "b817b823117fb69cc6dae43f2f6f1e27ac7db66e4bac5b0351608b636ee7835a",
    "verified_classes": [
      "AgentCardProvenanceError"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "verify_delegation_envelope",
      "_canonical_card_bytes"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 2,
    "defensive_guards_count": 4,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "AgentCardProvenanceError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [
      "card_digest mismatch: cached or substituted card cannot authorize envelope",
      "iss does not match fetched card id",
      "kid not present in fetched card key set"
    ],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "hashlib",
      "hmac",
      "json"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
