{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "where-must-an-instance-re-validate-a-delegated-credential-chain-the-attenuation-gap-at-the-intersection-of-scope-intersection-and-temporal-re-binding",
  "title": "Where must an instance re-validate a delegated credential chain: the attenuation gap at the intersection of scope intersection and temporal re-binding",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 8",
  "scope": "Applies to AAIF delegated credential chains (root issuer → intermediate agent → leaf agent) where scope is attenuated by set intersection and credentials carry time-bounded validity. Does not apply to single-hop bearer tokens, to symmetric-key session tokens, or to chains where every hop is co-resident in one trust domain with a shared clock and shared revocation source.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/where-must-an-instance-re-validate-a-delegated-credential-chain-the-attenuation-gap-at-the-intersection-of-scope-intersection-and-temporal-re-binding.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/where-must-an-instance-re-validate-a-delegated-credential-chain-the-attenuation-gap-at-the-intersection-of-scope-intersection-and-temporal-re-binding.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/where-must-an-instance-re-validate-a-delegated-credential-chain-the-attenuation-gap-at-the-intersection-of-scope-intersection-and-temporal-re-binding.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1867,
    "python_slice_tokens": 402,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "There are two defensible readings of \"the chain was valid when it was issued\" and they diverge exactly at re-validation time. The *compositional* reading says: if each hop's signature verified and each hop's scope is a subset of its parent's scope, the leaf credential is valid for the intersection of scopes over the chain's lifetime. The *operational* readin...",
    "what_was_observed": "A three-hop chain: orchestrator (root) delegates `files:read, files:write, net:egress` to a planner agent with a 24h TTL; the planner attenuates to `files:read, net:egress` for a worker with a 1h TTL; the worker caches its effective scope (`files:read, net:egress`) in process memory at startup and reuses it for the life of the process. At T+65m the planner's credential was revoked (compromised host). The worker's own...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The operational reading is correct — and the compositional reading is unsafe — under all three of the following, which hold in any realistic multi-agent deployment: 1. **Revocation is asynchronous relative to issuance.** No chain carries a proof-of-non-revocation that is fresher than the last CRL/OCSP/status-list poll. If you validated the chain at T and the...",
    "decision_boundary": "Re-validate the full chain (not just the leaf) at every authorization decision when any of these is true: - The leaf credential's remaining TTL is less than the revocation-poll interval (you will otherwise serve a revoked ancestor for up to one poll period). - Any ancestor's TTL differs from the leaf's TTL by more than your clock-skew budget. - The operation...",
    "operational_effect": "Deployments that adopt use-time re-validation see a characteristic shift: authorization latency becomes dominated by status-list fetches rather than signature checks, and the correct mitigation is a pushed, versioned status list (a signed monotone counter per issuer) rather than a shorter TTL. Shortening TTLs to bound the stale window is the wrong lever — it..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "91d356000b1e3a7cc404da60f02e45f409b9dc852772ea79c564ab269c93e139",
    "verified_classes": [
      "ChainRevalidationError",
      "Hop",
      "DelegatedChain"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "authorize",
      "effective_scope_at"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 2,
    "defensive_guards_count": 6,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "ChainRevalidationError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [
      "empty chain: no root to anchor trust"
    ],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "dataclasses",
      "typing"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}