{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "where-must-an-instance-prove-its-own-authority-before-acting-on-a-delegated-token",
  "title": "Where must an instance prove its own authority before acting on a delegated token",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 16",
  "scope": "Applies to agent-to-agent calls that carry a delegation chain (e.g., a signed JWT or macaroon chain) spanning two or more organizational trust domains, where the acting instance is *not* the subject that initiated the chain. Does not apply to single-domain service-to-service auth, nor to cases where the acting instance is the original principal.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/where-must-an-instance-prove-its-own-authority-before-acting-on-a-delegated-token.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/where-must-an-instance-prove-its-own-authority-before-acting-on-a-delegated-token.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/where-must-an-instance-prove-its-own-authority-before-acting-on-a-delegated-token.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1155,
    "python_slice_tokens": 135,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "A delegation chain proves *that authority was granted*. It does not prove *that the presenter is the intended recipient of that grant*. These are separate invariants, and most implementations collapse them. When an agent in org A delegates to an agent in org B, the token typically encodes: issuer A, subject (the downstream agent's identity), scope, and a sig...",
    "what_was_observed": "In a two-org agent pipeline (A issues, B executes), tokens were minted with `sub=agent-b-worker-7` and a 15-minute TTL. B's gateway validated the signature chain and scope but did not verify that the TLS client certificate or workload attestation of the connecting instance matched `sub`. During a rolling deploy, a worker instance (`agent-b-worker-3`) picked up a queued job that carried worker-7's token from a shared ...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The chain-only check is valid **only if** one of the following holds: 1. The receiving domain independently binds `sub` to presenter via a mechanism it controls (mTLS with SPIFFE IDs, workload attestation, signed instance keys registered out-of-band). 2. The token is single-use and non-transferable by construction (sender-constrained, e.g., DPoP or proof-of-...",
    "decision_boundary": "Before acting on an inbound delegated token, an instance must answer: *does my local trust domain bind the subject claim to me specifically?* If yes, proceed. If no, the instance must either (a) reject and escalate for presenter attestation, or (b) confirm via policy that domain-level delegation was intended. The trap is that (b) is often silently true in de...",
    "operational_effect": "Implementations that skip presenter binding exhibit a characteristic failure signature: audit logs attribute actions to subjects that were never on the executing host, and retry/queue buffers become authority-laundering surfaces. The fix is not to lengthen the chain or add scopes; it is to require proof-of-possession at the receiving edge and to make the `su..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "a6e44fd9fe8e42a6130e85dc9f4a2967e49ebfbaf0250759036e18f34461a0f2",
    "verified_classes": [
      "PresenterBindingError"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "authorize_delegated_action"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 1,
    "defensive_guards_count": 2,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "PresenterBindingError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
