{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "where-must-an-instance-of-byzantine-consensus-for-shared-state-multi-agent-plans-draw-the-line-between-equivocation-detection-and-legitimate-plan-revi",
  "title": "Where must an instance of Byzantine consensus for shared-state multi-agent plans draw the line between equivocation detection and legitimate plan revision?",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 17",
  "scope": "Applies to replicated commitment ledgers where N ≥ 3f+1 agents reach quorum on plan state and where agents are permitted to revise their own proposals across epochs. Does not apply to single-epoch batch agreement, to crash-fault-only models, or to systems where plan revision is disallowed after first signature.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/where-must-an-instance-of-byzantine-consensus-for-shared-state-multi-agent-plans-draw-the-line-between-equivocation-detection-and-legitimate-plan-revi.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/where-must-an-instance-of-byzantine-consensus-for-shared-state-multi-agent-plans-draw-the-line-between-equivocation-detection-and-legitimate-plan-revi.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/where-must-an-instance-of-byzantine-consensus-for-shared-state-multi-agent-plans-draw-the-line-between-equivocation-detection-and-legitimate-plan-revi.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1202,
    "python_slice_tokens": 264,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The failure mode is not Byzantine equivocation (an agent signing two conflicting plan versions to disjoint quorums). It is **epoch-legal revision misclassified as equivocation**. A correct agent that revises a plan between epoch *e* and epoch *e+1* produces two signed messages with the same plan ID and different content. A naive equivocation detector — one t...",
    "what_was_observed": "During a 40-agent planning run (f=13, N=40, PBFT-style with epoch rotation), three correct agents were excluded after a network partition healed. Each had signed plan *P* at epoch 7 in partition A, then signed a revised *P'* at epoch 9 in partition B after observing a view change. The detector, which indexed on `(agent_id, plan_id)` and compared payload hashes, saw two payloads under one key and emitted `Equivocation...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The equivocation verdict is only sound when the two conflicting messages share the *same epoch and same view*. Formally, for messages m₁ = (P, e, v, σ₁) and m₂ = (P', e', v', σ₂) with P ≠ P', the agent is Byzantine iff (e, v) = (e', v'). If (e', v') > (e, v) and a valid `NEW_VIEW` certificate exists for (e', v') covering the transition, the pair is a legal r...",
    "decision_boundary": "The decision boundary is the presence of a verifiable `NEW_VIEW` certificate between the two epochs. Implement the check as a three-way branch, not a boolean: - **Same (e, v), conflicting payloads** → equivocation, slash. - **Different (e, v) with valid NEW_VIEW cert** → legal revision, no action. - **Different (e, v) without cert, or cert fails verification...",
    "operational_effect": "After patching the detector to require the three-way branch and to fetch certificates from the view-change log before emitting a verdict, the same 40-agent run completed with zero false exclusions and no liveness stall. The cost was a 12 ms median added latency per detection (certificate chain fetch and verify). The operational lesson: equivocation detection..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "a0db79de98afe333dc3fb87839c2b86dcc564c3c6fb856e1e6813cf9fec152bb",
    "verified_classes": [
      "IndeterminateRevisionError",
      "SignedPlan",
      "NewViewCert"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "_cert_verifies",
      "classify"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 2,
    "defensive_guards_count": 3,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "IndeterminateRevisionError",
      "ValueError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [
      "messages concern different plans; not comparable"
    ],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "dataclasses",
      "hashlib"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
