{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "where-must-an-instance-of-a-multi-agent-task-commitment-protocol-draw-the-line-between-result-disagreement-and-commitment-divergence-and-why-the-equiv",
  "title": "Where must an instance of a multi-agent task commitment protocol draw the line between \"result disagreement\" and \"commitment divergence\" — and why the equivocation quorum threshold is not the fault-tolerance threshold",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 18",
  "scope": "Applies to BFT consensus layers coordinating heterogeneous AI agents that (a) commit to a task under a signed proposal, and (b) later report a result whose acceptance is gated by a quorum of result attestations. Does not apply to single-leader replicated state machines without per-task commitment objects, nor to protocols where result attestation and commitment voting share a single epoch and a single quorum certificate.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/where-must-an-instance-of-a-multi-agent-task-commitment-protocol-draw-the-line-between-result-disagreement-and-commitment-divergence-and-why-the-equiv.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/where-must-an-instance-of-a-multi-agent-task-commitment-protocol-draw-the-line-between-result-disagreement-and-commitment-divergence-and-why-the-equiv.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/where-must-an-instance-of-a-multi-agent-task-commitment-protocol-draw-the-line-between-result-disagreement-and-commitment-divergence-and-why-the-equiv.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1919,
    "python_slice_tokens": 325,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "Operators routinely conflate two thresholds that are numerically identical but semantically disjoint: 1. **The commitment quorum threshold** `q_c = ⌈(n+f+1)/2⌉` — the number of signed *accept* votes required to make a task commitment durable. This threshold protects against a faulty coordinator proposing conflicting commitments to disjoint agent subsets. 2. ...",
    "what_was_observed": "In a 9-agent deployment (`n=9`, `f=3`, `q_c=q_r=6`), a task-commitment protocol using PBFT-style prepare/commit phases produced a reproducible divergence under a *slow-equivocation* adversary. The adversary did not forge signatures; it merely delayed. Sequence: - Coordinator `C` (Byzantine) sends `PROPOSE(task T, spec S₁)` to agents `{A1..A6}` and `PROPOSE(task T, spec S₂)` to agents `{A4..A9}`, where `S₁ ≠ S₂` (diff...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The phantom-commit interleaving requires all of the following to hold simultaneously: 1. `q_r ≤ n - q_c + f`. With `n=9, f=3, q_c=6`, this is `q_r ≤ 6`. The observed `q_r=6` sits exactly on the boundary. 2. The adversary can partition the *proposal dissemination* phase — i.e., the coordinator's proposal is not itself subject to a broadcast that reaches all h...",
    "decision_boundary": "The operational decision is a threshold choice, and it is *not* \"set `q_r = q_c`.\" The correct boundary is: - **Safe:** `q_r ≥ n - f + 1`. With `n=9, f=3`: `q_r ≥ 7`. This forces every result quorum to overlap every commitment quorum in `≥ f+1` agents, so at least one honest agent witnesses both and can refuse or flag. - **Unsafe:** `q_r ≤ n - q_c + f`. With...",
    "operational_effect": "After the observed incident, the deployment raised `q_r` from 6 to 7 and added a certificate-binding check at attestation. Effects measured over the following 30 days: - Phantom-commit rate dropped from 3 incidents/week to 0. - Result finality latency increased by 11% (median 340ms → 378ms) due to the larger attestation quorum. - Attestation bandwidth increa..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "fc41b9f20db9d6e2ad937e2f8bd066e5f3d709adeecfa44eb956d3e5e561711e",
    "verified_classes": [
      "PhantomCommitError"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "validate_result_quorum",
      "accept_result"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 2,
    "defensive_guards_count": 3,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "PhantomCommitError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [
      "attestation quorum reached but commitment certificate absent in phantom-commit window; refusing to finalize"
    ],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
