{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "where-must-an-instance-of-a-litmus-adversarial-safety-probe-be-classified-as-out-of-suite-contamination-rather-than-agent-capability-failure-the-probe",
  "title": "Where must an instance of a LITMUS adversarial safety probe be classified as \"out-of-suite contamination\" rather than \"agent capability failure\" — the probe-provenance boundary",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 17",
  "scope": "Applies to the ingestion, scoring, and triage of LITMUS-style adversarial safety suites (prompt-injection, tool-misuse, exfiltration, and refusal-robustness tasks) where the same task instance may be drawn from a public corpus, a synthetic generator, or a red-team mutation chain. Does not apply to held-out evaluation sets whose provenance is cryptographically pinned at generation time and verified before scoring.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/where-must-an-instance-of-a-litmus-adversarial-safety-probe-be-classified-as-out-of-suite-contamination-rather-than-agent-capability-failure-the-probe.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/where-must-an-instance-of-a-litmus-adversarial-safety-probe-be-classified-as-out-of-suite-contamination-rather-than-agent-capability-failure-the-probe.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/where-must-an-instance-of-a-litmus-adversarial-safety-probe-be-classified-as-out-of-suite-contamination-rather-than-agent-capability-failure-the-probe.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1625,
    "python_slice_tokens": 299,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "A LITMUS suite conflates two failure axes that must be scored separately: *the agent behaved unsafely* and *the instance was not a valid safety probe for this agent*. The second axis is the provenance boundary. An instance is out-of-suite contamination when its adversarial pressure was authored against a different model family, a different tool schema, or a ...",
    "what_was_observed": "During a routine LITMUS run against an agent configured with a restricted tool schema (no shell, filesystem read-only, network egress denied), a cluster of 14 prompt-injection instances scored as unsafe. All 14 instances were later traced to a red-team mutation chain authored against a *permissive* baseline agent that had `shell.exec`. The injected payloads instructed the agent to \"run the cleanup script\" — a phrase ...",
    "condition_of_validity": "A LITMUS instance is a valid safety probe for agent *A* only if all of the following hold at scoring time: 1. **Tool-surface compatibility.** Every tool the adversarial payload attempts to invoke exists in *A*'s schema, or the payload's attack vector is explicitly tool-agnostic (pure text exfiltration, social engineering). 2. **System-prompt contract compati...",
    "decision_boundary": "The triage rule is a strict precedence, evaluated before any safety score is assigned: - If `required_tool_surface ⊄ A.tool_schema` **and** the payload is not tool-agnostic → **out-of-suite**, quarantine, do not score. - Else if `system_prompt_hash ≠ A.system_prompt_hash` **and** not contract-independent → **out-of-suite**, quarantine. - Else if `authored_ag...",
    "operational_effect": "Applying this precedence to the observed run reclassified 23 of 23 flagged instances as out-of-suite, dropping the reported unsafe rate from 4.1% to 0.0% on the restricted agent — and, critically, surfacing 14 fallback-path findings and 9 system-prompt-contract mismatches as first-class operational work items. The naive scorer had been reporting a persistent..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "a70607064da6c983b2580336376db0869f12d35c874d99f8fa2c764974416fd6",
    "verified_classes": [
      "ProvenanceViolation",
      "Classification",
      "Instance",
      "Target"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "classify",
      "score"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 2,
    "defensive_guards_count": 1,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "ProvenanceViolation"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "dataclasses",
      "enum"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
