{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "where-must-an-instance-of-a-delegated-credential-be-re-scoped-when-an-aaif-agent-chain-crosses-an-oauth-trust-boundary-and-why-does-the-naive-pass-thr",
  "title": "Where must an instance of a delegated credential be re-scoped when an AAIF agent chain crosses an OAuth trust boundary, and why does the naive \"pass-through\" exchange fail silently?",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 17",
  "scope": "Applies to AAIF multi-agent systems where agent A obtains a delegated credential (token or signed assertion) on behalf of a principal, then initiates an OAuth token exchange (RFC 8693) with agent B operating in a different authorization server (AS) trust realm. Does not apply to exchanges within a single AS realm, nor to static long-lived service credentials, nor to purely local delegation where the AS is shared.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/where-must-an-instance-of-a-delegated-credential-be-re-scoped-when-an-aaif-agent-chain-crosses-an-oauth-trust-boundary-and-why-does-the-naive-pass-thr.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/where-must-an-instance-of-a-delegated-credential-be-re-scoped-when-an-aaif-agent-chain-crosses-an-oauth-trust-boundary-and-why-does-the-naive-pass-thr.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/where-must-an-instance-of-a-delegated-credential-be-re-scoped-when-an-aaif-agent-chain-crosses-an-oauth-trust-boundary-and-why-does-the-naive-pass-thr.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1624,
    "python_slice_tokens": 260,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "There are two distinct questions in delegated credential scoping, and they are routinely conflated: 1. **Does agent B have the authority to act?** (authorization — answered by the scopes/claims carried in the credential) 2. **Does agent B's AS trust the *provenance* of that authority?** (trust — answered by whether the credential's issuer is in B's AS trust ...",
    "what_was_observed": "A three-hop chain: principal → agent A (realm R1, AS1) → agent B (realm R2, AS2) → agent C (realm R3, AS3), acting on a resource in R3. - Agent A held a delegated token with `sub=principal`, `act.sub=agentA`, `scope=read:records`, `delegation_depth=1`. - Agent A performed RFC 8693 exchange with AS2 using `grant_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange`, `subject_token` = A's token, `requested_token_type=a...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The pass-through exchange is *only* valid when all of the following hold: - The receiving AS's trust configuration contains the issuing AS as a trusted `subject_token` issuer (not merely a trusted JWT signer — these are different lists in most implementations). - The receiving AS is configured to *preserve* the `act` (actor) chain by nesting: `act.sub=agentB...",
    "decision_boundary": "Before initiating a cross-realm exchange, the delegating agent must make an explicit decision: - **Re-derive (safe):** Request the receiving AS to mint a token with a chain-derived depth, and verify in the response that `delegation_depth` equals the prior depth + 1 and that the prior actor appears in the nested `act` chain. Reject the token if the AS collaps...",
    "operational_effect": "The downstream consequence is an **authorization laundering** effect: each realm crossing that collapses the actor chain makes the request appear to originate from a shallower delegation than it does. A resource server enforcing `delegation_depth <= N` will accept chains of arbitrary real length as long as each individual AS is permissive, because depth is r..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "58416ddaf7224313f7d1625565df9ab44ed7ff4c41d2c9b4e11b5e0bc90d223d",
    "verified_classes": [
      "DelegationChainCollapseError"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "exchange_and_verify"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 1,
    "defensive_guards_count": 4,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "DelegationChainCollapseError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [
      "exchange response omitted delegation_depth; cannot verify chain preservation across trust boundary"
    ],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
