{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "where-must-an-instance-of-a-delegated-capability-refuse-to-act-when-its-provenance-chain-is-valid-but-its-revocation-set-is-only-partially-visible",
  "title": "Where must an instance of a delegated capability refuse to act when its provenance chain is valid but its revocation set is only partially visible",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 12",
  "scope": "This record applies to agent-to-agent delegation chains where each hop carries a signed capability token (provenance) and revocation is propagated asynchronously across issuers. It does not apply to single-hop authority, to chains where revocation is read synchronously from a single authoritative ledger, or to purely advisory (non-enforcing) provenance.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/where-must-an-instance-of-a-delegated-capability-refuse-to-act-when-its-provenance-chain-is-valid-but-its-revocation-set-is-only-partially-visible.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/where-must-an-instance-of-a-delegated-capability-refuse-to-act-when-its-provenance-chain-is-valid-but-its-revocation-set-is-only-partially-visible.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/where-must-an-instance-of-a-delegated-capability-refuse-to-act-when-its-provenance-chain-is-valid-but-its-revocation-set-is-only-partially-visible.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1908,
    "python_slice_tokens": 396,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "There are two independent questions an acting agent must answer before exercising a delegated capability: 1. **Provenance validity** — Is there a signed, unbroken chain from a root principal to me, with each hop's constraints narrowing (never widening) the previous hop? 2. **Revocation freshness** — Have any links in that chain, or any ancestors of those lin...",
    "what_was_observed": "In a three-hop chain (root `R` → orchestrator `A` → sub-agent `B` → tool-executor `C`), the following sequence recurred across multiple incidents: - `R` issued a capability to `A` with a 24-hour TTL and a revocation endpoint at `R`. - `A` re-delegated a narrowed capability to `B`; `B` re-delegated to `C`. - `R` revoked `A`'s capability at T+3h (compromised orchestrator credential). - `A`'s revocation propagated to `B...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The provenance-implies-authority inference is only valid under a condition that is almost never stated in protocol specs: > An agent may treat a valid provenance chain as authoritative **only if, for every link in the chain, it has a revocation view whose freshness bound is at least as tight as the shortest remaining TTL in the chain, AND that view is transi...",
    "decision_boundary": "The boundary is not \"is the chain valid?\" but \"**is my revocation knowledge complete enough to justify this specific action right now?**\" Concretely, an agent must refuse when any of the following hold, even with a perfectly valid chain: - The revocation view's staleness bound exceeds the smallest remaining TTL in the chain (the token could expire-and-be-rev...",
    "operational_effect": "Agents that internalize this boundary convert a silent, hours-long authorization leak into a bounded, loud refusal. The observable effects: - **Fail-closed on coverage gaps.** An executor that cannot reach an ancestor's revocation endpoint refuses rather than executing on partial knowledge. This surfaces trust-domain topology bugs (like the `B`-feed omission..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "e1ce27ed794775fb1368a780910e9e72b0d9aa3ec41b5304a3ca30871cef1aeb",
    "verified_classes": [
      "DelegationRefused",
      "Link",
      "RevocationView"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "authorize_action",
      "execute_delegated"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 2,
    "defensive_guards_count": 6,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "DelegationRefused"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [
      "irreversible action with thin freshness margin; fail closed"
    ],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "dataclasses",
      "time"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}