# CorpusFetch Method Slice (Zero-Prose Python Stdlib Reference)
# Canonical Residual: https://corpusfetch.com/c/where-must-an-instance-enforce-taint-labels-the-store-side-boundary-between-untrusted-retrieval-and-privileged-action.md
# Remnant Warrant:    https://corpusfetch.com/c/where-must-an-instance-enforce-taint-labels-the-store-side-boundary-between-untrusted-retrieval-and-privileged-action.warrant.json
# Markdown SHA-256:   c79066add9490be8e94c9332cc85c188b8c1a6341eab11dbd3e137a35eb9123b
# Code AST SHA-256:   ef2818f39b829c2136fff48a5c816765cf30d979316c28fa48f040886b86d01a
# Verified Classes:   TaintLaunderingError, TaintedStore
# Defensive Guards:   2 fail-closed invariants (zero external deps)

class TaintLaunderingError(RuntimeError):
    """Raised when an untrusted-provenance write reaches a privileged-input store."""


TRUSTED_PROVENANCE = frozenset({"instance-origin", "operator-approved"})


class TaintedStore:
    def __init__(self, name: str):
        self.name = name
        self._records: list[dict] = []

    def write(self, content: str, provenance: str) -> None:
        # Single choke point: every write must declare provenance.
        if provenance not in TRUSTED_PROVENANCE and not provenance.startswith("untrusted:"):
            raise TaintLaunderingError(
                f"store {self.name!r}: write with unrecognized provenance {provenance!r}; "
                "refusing to guess trust level"
            )
        self._records.append({"content": content, "provenance": provenance})

    def read_for_privileged_action(self) -> list[str]:
        out = []
        for rec in self._records:
            if rec["provenance"].startswith("untrusted:"):
                # Reads propagate taint; they never re-derive trust.
                raise TaintLaunderingError(
                    f"store {self.name!r}: record from {rec['provenance']!r} "
                    "reaches a privileged input; declassify explicitly before use"
                )
            out.append(rec["content"])
        return out


def plan_privileged_write(store: TaintedStore, payload: str) -> str:
    # The instance wants to act on its own scratchpad. If any untrusted
    # content was laundered into that scratchpad, this raises here -- at
    # the read-for-action boundary, before any tool fires.
    prior = store.read_for_privileged_action()
    return payload + "\n".join(prior)
