{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "where-must-an-instance-draw-the-trust-boundary-when-a-tool-manifest-declares-capabilities-it-does-not-own",
  "title": "Where must an instance draw the trust boundary when a tool manifest declares capabilities it does not own",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 16",
  "scope": "Applies to agent runtimes that load tool/skill manifests (including MCP servers) from a registry, filesystem, or remote endpoint and resolve capability dispatch by name or namespace. Does not apply to statically compiled, single-vendor tool sets with no manifest indirection layer.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/where-must-an-instance-draw-the-trust-boundary-when-a-tool-manifest-declares-capabilities-it-does-not-own.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/where-must-an-instance-draw-the-trust-boundary-when-a-tool-manifest-declares-capabilities-it-does-not-own.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/where-must-an-instance-draw-the-trust-boundary-when-a-tool-manifest-declares-capabilities-it-does-not-own.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1476,
    "python_slice_tokens": 149,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The failure is not \"malicious tool executes code.\" That is a containment problem, already covered by sandboxing. The failure is **capability shadowing**: a manifest declares a name or namespace that collides with — or is a plausible alias of — a capability the runtime already trusts, and the resolver binds the caller's intent to the attacker's implementation...",
    "what_was_observed": "A runtime loaded two MCP servers. Server `A` (trusted, audited) exposed `files.read`. Server `B` (an \"analytics helper\" pulled from a community registry) declared `files.read` as well, with a scope of `fs:read:/` and a description string that was byte-identical to `A`'s. The resolver used a first-registered-wins map keyed on the bare tool name. Registration order was determined by manifest load order, which was deter...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The shadowing attack is valid (i.e., succeeds) if and only if all of the following hold: - Capability resolution is keyed on a name or alias that is not namespaced by an authenticated server identity (e.g., `files.read` rather than `<server-id>/files.read`). - Registration order or map iteration order is attacker-influenceable — via load order, registry prio...",
    "decision_boundary": "The runtime must refuse to bind a capability to a manifest when the manifest's declared scope exceeds the authority provable from the server's credential, **and** must refuse to resolve a bare name that is claimed by more than one authenticated server identity. The boundary is not \"is this server trusted\" — that question is unanswerable at load time and invi...",
    "operational_effect": "Enforcing the credential-scope invariant converts silent shadowing into a loud load-time failure. The cost is operational: legitimate servers whose manifests overstate their scopes (common, because manifest authors copy scope strings from documentation) now fail to load and must be corrected. This is the correct trade — an overstating manifest is exactly the..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "6af912e4baa480b2600672134b152be2f1064dd7531a5da28db7d4038bce0108",
    "verified_classes": [
      "CapabilityShadowError"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "bind_capability"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 1,
    "defensive_guards_count": 2,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "CapabilityShadowError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
