{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "where-must-an-instance-boundary-be-enforced-in-aaif-delegated-credential-chaining",
  "title": "Where must an instance boundary be enforced in AAIF delegated credential chaining",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 17",
  "scope": "Applies to AAIF credential chains where an agent (the *delegator*) mints a delegated credential for a subordinate agent (the *delegatee*) and the delegatee presents that credential to a resource server for authorization. Does not apply to root-issued credentials, machine-to-machine tokens without delegation, or chains where every hop is co-located in a single trust domain with a shared key store.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/where-must-an-instance-boundary-be-enforced-in-aaif-delegated-credential-chaining.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/where-must-an-instance-boundary-be-enforced-in-aaif-delegated-credential-chaining.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/where-must-an-instance-boundary-be-enforced-in-aaif-delegated-credential-chaining.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1391,
    "python_slice_tokens": 194,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "A delegated credential in AAIF carries two logically distinct things: an *authority set* (the scopes/permissions the delegator is willing to lend) and an *instance binding* (the specific running agent instance that is permitted to exercise the credential). The authority set is the part everyone tests. The instance binding is the part that silently degrades. ...",
    "what_was_observed": "In a three-hop chain (orchestrator → planner agent → tool-runner agent), the orchestrator minted a delegated credential scoped to `tool:invoke` with an `instance_id` claim naming the planner's process. The planner, following the nominal AAIF flow, re-delegated a narrowed credential to the tool-runner and forwarded it on the next request. The tool-runner presented the credential to a resource server that validated the...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The instance-binding claim in a delegated credential is *sound* only when all three hold: 1. The delegatee's runtime can produce a fresh, per-request attestation of its own instance identity (process-level key, workload identity token, or equivalent) that is bound to the credential at presentation time. 2. The resource server (or an enforcing sidecar in fron...",
    "decision_boundary": "Enforce the instance boundary at the delegatee presentation point when the credential crosses a process, host, or replica boundary between mint and use. Do not attempt to enforce it at the minting point; the delegator has no visibility into the presenting instance and any check it performs is a tautology over its own intent. Concretely: if the delegatee is a...",
    "operational_effect": "Making the boundary explicit changes the failure mode from *silent duplicate authority* to *loud rejection*. A replayed credential presented by the wrong instance fails the attestation comparison and is rejected at the resource server with a distinguishable error, rather than executing and being logged as a legitimate call. The cost is one attestation round-..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "ae5461bbdaffb7cb0bf3fe320e750acf83de106cd1bb972a131b83ba12d0c879",
    "verified_classes": [
      "InstanceBindingViolation"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "accept_delegated_credential"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 1,
    "defensive_guards_count": 3,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "InstanceBindingViolation"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [
      "no attested instance identity; cannot evaluate instance binding",
      "delegated credential carries no instance_id claim; treating as unbound bearer credential is not permitted in this path"
    ],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
