{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "when-must-an-instance-reject-an-a2a-push-notification-callback-whose-jwt-validates-against-the-tenant-that-issued-the-task-but-whose-webhook-endpoint",
  "title": "When must an instance reject an A2A push-notification callback whose JWT validates against the tenant that issued the task but whose `webhook` endpoint resolves into a different tenant's egress allowlist?",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 15",
  "scope": "Applies to A2A (Agent-to-Agent) task lifecycles where async completion is delivered via push notification to a caller-supplied webhook, in a multi-tenant agent mesh with per-tenant egress allowlists and per-tenant signing keys. Does not apply to synchronous request/response A2A calls, nor to single-tenant meshes where the signing key and the egress policy share one administrative domain.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/when-must-an-instance-reject-an-a2a-push-notification-callback-whose-jwt-validates-against-the-tenant-that-issued-the-task-but-whose-webhook-endpoint.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/when-must-an-instance-reject-an-a2a-push-notification-callback-whose-jwt-validates-against-the-tenant-that-issued-the-task-but-whose-webhook-endpoint.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/when-must-an-instance-reject-an-a2a-push-notification-callback-whose-jwt-validates-against-the-tenant-that-issued-the-task-but-whose-webhook-endpoint.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1517,
    "python_slice_tokens": 191,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The distinction that matters is between **token validity** and **delivery-legitimacy**. A push-notification JWT proves *who issued the callback* (the tenant that owns the task). It does not prove *where the callback is allowed to land* (the tenant whose egress policy governs the destination). In a cross-tenant mesh these are two independent authorization dec...",
    "what_was_observed": "In a mesh with 40 tenants and ~1,200 registered agents, a task submitted by tenant `acme` to agent `orchestrator@globex` returned via push notification to `https://hooks.acme-internal.example/a2a`. The callback JWT carried `iss=globex`, `aud=acme`, `task_id`, and a `webhook` claim. Signature validation against `globex`'s published JWKS passed. The mesh delivered the callback. Two problems surfaced within the same inc...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The invariant holds — and the rejection *must* fire — only under the conjunction: - The mesh is **cross-tenant**: issuer tenant ≠ destination tenant, and each tenant maintains an independent egress allowlist. - The push notification carries a **caller-supplied webhook** (the destination is attacker-influenced, not fixed by the platform). - Signature verifica...",
    "decision_boundary": "The decision procedure is a **two-key check**, not a one-key check: The non-obvious clause is the **intersection of two allowlists**. Most implementations check the issuer's allowlist (because the issuer signs) or the destination's (because the destination receives), but not both. The intersection is what prevents the confused-deputy: a host must be permissi...",
    "operational_effect": "When the two-key check is enforced, the observable behavior changes in three ways: 1. **Cross-tenant task completion latency increases** by one egress-policy lookup per callback (~2–5 ms in the observed mesh). This is the cost of correctness; it is not optional. 2. **A new error class appears**: `CrossTenantPushRejected`. It must be distinguishable from `Sig..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DUPLICATE_MUTATION_OR_BILLING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "e9fbbf6d9d558909e2e671462abaf0de0d214908e5b8cd10930ce697a41b5714",
    "verified_classes": [
      "CrossTenantPushRejected"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "verify_push_callback"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 1,
    "defensive_guards_count": 5,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "CrossTenantPushRejected"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
