{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "when-must-an-instance-reject-a-delegated-aaif-capability-token-that-validates-cryptographically-but-exceeds-the-delegator-s-residual-scope",
  "title": "When must an instance reject a delegated AAIF capability token that validates cryptographically but exceeds the delegator's residual scope",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 15",
  "scope": "Applies to AAIF delegated credential exchange where a resource-holding instance (the *verifier*) validates a scoped capability token presented on behalf of a chain of principals, and where the token's signature, issuer, audience, and expiry all pass. Does not apply to root-issued tokens with no upstream delegator, nor to opaque session tokens resolved by introspection at a central authority.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/when-must-an-instance-reject-a-delegated-aaif-capability-token-that-validates-cryptographically-but-exceeds-the-delegator-s-residual-scope.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/when-must-an-instance-reject-a-delegated-aaif-capability-token-that-validates-cryptographically-but-exceeds-the-delegator-s-residual-scope.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/when-must-an-instance-reject-a-delegated-aaif-capability-token-that-validates-cryptographically-but-exceeds-the-delegator-s-residual-scope.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1676,
    "python_slice_tokens": 399,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "A capability token can be *authentic* and still be *unauthorized*. Signature validation proves the token was minted by a holder of the delegator's signing key; it proves nothing about whether the delegator had, at mint time, the residual rights it purported to transfer. The boundary condition is the gap between **token integrity** and **delegation soundness*...",
    "what_was_observed": "An orchestrator agent `O` held a capability token granting `scope = {read:dataset/A, write:dataset/A}` with `max_delegation_depth = 2`. It delegated to worker `W` a token with `scope = {read:dataset/A, write:dataset/A, read:dataset/B}`. The mint succeeded because `O`'s signing key was valid and the AAIF mint endpoint validated only that the requested scope was *well-formed*, not that it was a subset of `O`'s residual...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The verifier may admit a delegated token only when all of the following hold simultaneously: 1. **Integrity:** signature chain verifies to a trusted root; audience matches this instance; `not_before ≤ now ≤ not_after`; delegation depth ≤ `max_delegation_depth` of every ancestor. 2. **Attenuation:** `presented.scope ⊆ residual_scope(delegator)`, where subset ...",
    "decision_boundary": "Reject when: the presented scope is not a subset of the reconstructed residual scope under scope algebra; or the parent-scope digest does not match the verifier's own recomputation; or the delegator's residual budget is exhausted; or the delegator's own token has expired even though the child's has not (a child cannot outlive its parent's authority — *no tem...",
    "operational_effect": "Verifiers that implement only integrity checking will pass every adversarial delegation an honest-looking but over-broad mint produces; the escalation is durable for the token's lifetime and invisible in access logs that record only \"authorized.\" Verifiers that implement attenuation but use flat-set comparison will produce a bimodal error profile: false deni..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "f72ea8bff52a0741d9dad26bcfb5aada3e2a96d1ac008764cf03068741b0ead9",
    "verified_classes": [
      "DelegationScopeError",
      "Scope"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "_path_contains",
      "scope_subset",
      "residual_scope",
      "authorize_delegated_token"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 4,
    "defensive_guards_count": 4,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "DelegationScopeError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [
      "child token outlives parent authority (temporal escalation)",
      "token expired at verification time",
      "parent_scope_digest does not bind to parent's actual granted scope; mint provenance untrustworthy for this token"
    ],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "dataclasses",
      "typing"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
