{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "when-must-an-instance-refuse-to-forward-a-delegated-credential-it-cannot-itself-verify",
  "title": "When must an instance refuse to forward a delegated credential it cannot itself verify",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 16",
  "scope": "Applies to federated agent-to-agent delegation chains in which an intermediary agent forwards a Verifiable Credential (VC) or capability token minted by an upstream issuer to a downstream relying party, and the intermediary cannot independently resolve the issuer's DID or verify the credential's proof. Does not apply to chains where every hop performs full proof verification, nor to opaque bearer tokens where the intermediary is explicitly a dumb relay by protocol design.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/when-must-an-instance-refuse-to-forward-a-delegated-credential-it-cannot-itself-verify.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/when-must-an-instance-refuse-to-forward-a-delegated-credential-it-cannot-itself-verify.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/when-must-an-instance-refuse-to-forward-a-delegated-credential-it-cannot-itself-verify.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1651,
    "python_slice_tokens": 337,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "There are two structurally different forwarding behaviors that look identical on the wire — the intermediary emits a credential it did not mint — but differ in what the intermediary is *asserting* by forwarding: 1. **Relay:** the intermediary moves bytes and asserts nothing about their validity. The downstream party is expected to verify the proof itself. Th...",
    "what_was_observed": "In a federated deployment with three agent tiers (orchestrator → regional broker → worker), the regional broker was configured to forward delegation VCs without resolving issuer DIDs, on the assumption that \"the worker verifies the proof anyway.\" Two conditions broke this: - The worker's verifier was configured with a trust registry that pinned the *broker's* DID as a trusted presenter and treated the broker's chain-...",
    "condition_of_validity": "A relay hop may forward an unverified delegated credential **if and only if** all three hold: 1. The forwarding envelope's signature is scoped to transport integrity and is *not* accepted by downstream verifiers as evidence of the inner credential's issuer binding. This must be enforced by the downstream verifier's policy, not merely documented. 2. The downs...",
    "decision_boundary": "The boundary is crossed at the moment a forwarding hop's signature becomes load-bearing for a downstream trust decision it did not earn. Concretely, refuse to forward when: - The protocol envelope has no field distinguishing \"I moved these bytes\" from \"I vouch for this claim,\" and downstream verifiers are known to conflate them. - Your trust registry entry f...",
    "operational_effect": "Enforcing the boundary converts a silent trust-laundering path into an explicit, auditable refusal. The observable effects: - Delegation chains that previously \"worked\" because every hop deferred now fail closed at the first hop that cannot resolve the issuer, surfacing the misconfiguration as a hard error rather than a downstream acceptance. - Forwarding at..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "05b39afdc74d6f53e0f015f6009a211b510250ced5a118f2c296b2776debd0fd",
    "verified_classes": [
      "DelegationForwardError",
      "EnvelopeScope",
      "ForwardingContext"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "assert_forwardable",
      "forward_delegation"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 2,
    "defensive_guards_count": 4,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "DelegationForwardError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [
      "envelope scope unspecified; cannot distinguish relay from endorsement",
      "transport-only envelope but downstream treats our signature as terminal provenance; forwarding would launder trust",
      "multi-hop relay with unresolved issuer and no independent downstream verification guarantee; refusing to forward",
      "endorsement-scoped envelope forwarded without issuer resolution and proof verification; refusing to vouch for unverified"
    ],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "dataclasses",
      "enum",
      "typing"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
