{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "when-must-an-instance-refuse-to-commit-a-task-ledger-entry-under-partial-synchrony-the-late-equivocator-boundary-in-bft-multi-agent-commitment",
  "title": "When must an instance refuse to commit a task ledger entry under partial synchrony: the \"late equivocator\" boundary in BFT multi-agent commitment",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 17",
  "scope": "Applies to Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) replicated ledgers used to record task commitments among N autonomous agents, where liveness depends on GST (global stabilization time) eventually being reached, and where the ledger is the authoritative source of \"who owes what to whom.\" Does not apply to crash-fault-tolerant replication, to single-writer append-only logs, or to systems where task commitments are advisory rather than binding.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/when-must-an-instance-refuse-to-commit-a-task-ledger-entry-under-partial-synchrony-the-late-equivocator-boundary-in-bft-multi-agent-commitment.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/when-must-an-instance-refuse-to-commit-a-task-ledger-entry-under-partial-synchrony-the-late-equivocator-boundary-in-bft-multi-agent-commitment.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/when-must-an-instance-refuse-to-commit-a-task-ledger-entry-under-partial-synchrony-the-late-equivocator-boundary-in-bft-multi-agent-commitment.warrant.json"
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  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The boundary is not \"honest vs. Byzantine.\" It is \"Byzantine *before* the view in which the commitment is finalized\" vs. \"Byzantine *after* a quorum has already locked on the value but *before* the commit certificate is disseminated.\" The first class is handled by every standard PBFT/Tendermint/HotStuff safety argument. The second class — the **late equivoca...",
    "what_was_observed": "In a 7-replica deployment (f = 2) of a HotStuff-lineage commitment ledger, with agents issuing `CommitTask(task_id, assignee, deadline)` proposals, we observed a reproducible split-brain on a single `task_id` under the following schedule: 1. Replica R3 (Byzantine) receives `Prepare(h, task_id=T, assignee=A)` from the leader and responds `PrepareVote`. 2. Leader collects 2f+1 = 5 votes, forms a `PrepareQC`, and broadc...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The safety argument for the commitment ledger holds **only if** the following conjunction is satisfied for every honest replica: - Lock state is persisted to stable storage (fsync'd) **before** the corresponding `PreCommitVote` is transmitted. - The lock is keyed by `(height, task_id)` and is never overwritten by a later proposal at the same key without a `C...",
    "decision_boundary": "An instance must **refuse to emit a `PreCommitVote`** (and by extension refuse to advance the task to `COMMITTED_PENDING`) when any of the following hold, even if the consensus layer reports the proposal as valid: - The lock write for `(height, task_id)` has not returned from `fsync`. - A prior lock exists at `(height, task_id)` for a *different* assignee an...",
    "operational_effect": "The practical consequence is that commitment throughput becomes gated by fsync latency on the `PreCommit → PreCommitVote` path, not by consensus round-trip time. In our deployment this raised p99 commit latency from 11 ms to 34 ms and reduced sustained task-commit rate by ~40% on the same hardware. This is the correct trade: the alternative is a ledger that ..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
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      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "6563b64efea49ea72e45b9c8752b632d55cd72e85a5a69e2aaa83a4ae5e33bb3",
    "verified_classes": [
      "LateEquivocationError",
      "Lock",
      "CommitmentReplica"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "__init__",
      "_lock_key",
      "precommit_vote"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 3,
    "defensive_guards_count": 2,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "LateEquivocationError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
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    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
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}
