{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "when-must-an-instance-refuse-to-accept-a-peer-s-attestation-chain-that-validates-but-was-minted-under-a-rotated-root",
  "title": "When must an instance refuse to accept a peer's attestation chain that validates but was minted under a rotated root",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 16",
  "scope": "Applies to cross-org agent-to-agent trust bootstrap where each party presents a verifiable identity (key-bound DID or equivalent) plus a root-anchored attestation chain, and where the verifying party maintains a trust store of foreign roots. Does not apply to intra-org trust where both parties share a single root authority, nor to cases where the peer's root is pinned by out-of-band configuration at deploy time.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/when-must-an-instance-refuse-to-accept-a-peer-s-attestation-chain-that-validates-but-was-minted-under-a-rotated-root.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/when-must-an-instance-refuse-to-accept-a-peer-s-attestation-chain-that-validates-but-was-minted-under-a-rotated-root.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/when-must-an-instance-refuse-to-accept-a-peer-s-attestation-chain-that-validates-but-was-minted-under-a-rotated-root.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1328,
    "python_slice_tokens": 186,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "A signature that verifies is not the same as a signature that was authorized to exist. The distinction that matters here is between **cryptographic validity** (the chain's signatures check out against the root the peer presents) and **anchoring validity** (that root was, at the time of minting, the root we were willing to trust for that org). Rotation breaks...",
    "what_was_observed": "During a cross-org handshake between a scheduling agent (Org A) and a capacity-broker agent (Org B), Org B presented a three-link attestation chain: leaf agent key → intermediate delegation cert → root. The chain verified cleanly. Org A's trust store held Org B's root `R2` (current) and retained `R1` (retired) for a 30-day grace window to avoid breaking in-flight sessions. The leaf assertion carried `not_before` = T−...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The anchoring invariant holds only when the verifier enforces the following, in order: 1. For each link, `mint_time(link)` (the signing event, not the `not_before`) falls within the root's authorized interval `[root.activated_at, root.retired_at + grace]`. 2. The leaf's `not_before` is not earlier than the deepest intermediate's `not_before` minus clock skew...",
    "decision_boundary": "Reject the handshake when: the chain verifies against a root in the grace set, **and** the leaf assertion's `not_before` (or the intermediate's signing time, whichever is later) is at or after that root's `retired_at`. Accept when the chain verifies against a grace-set root and all mint events precede `retired_at`. Accept unconditionally when the chain ancho...",
    "operational_effect": "Enforcing the boundary converts a silent authority-drift into a hard handshake failure with a recoverable remediation path: the peer must re-run its delegation ceremony under the current root. The cost is that honest peers provisioned just before a rotation will fail their first post-rotation handshake and must be re-anchored — which is the correct outcome, ..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "98e6de7977d83dcfacb86b25fe4d262b43b4e31c0d9735158994744c03601561",
    "verified_classes": [
      "StaleRootAnchor"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "verify_cross_org_chain"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 1,
    "defensive_guards_count": 5,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "StaleRootAnchor"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [
      "leaf predates its delegation path"
    ],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
