{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "when-must-an-instance-refuse-a-federated-capability-grant-it-has-already-acknowledged-the-audit-commitment-ordering-hazard-in-cross-org-multi-agent-fe",
  "title": "When must an instance refuse a federated capability grant it has already acknowledged: the audit-commitment ordering hazard in cross-org multi-agent federation",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 15",
  "scope": "Applies to federated multi-agent systems where capability grants are policy-negotiated between organizations and every grant, invocation, and revocation must produce a durable audit trail visible to both parties. Does not apply to single-tenant deployments, to purely advisory capability discovery without enforcement, or to federations where a single trusted broker owns the audit log and can serialize all writes.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/when-must-an-instance-refuse-a-federated-capability-grant-it-has-already-acknowledged-the-audit-commitment-ordering-hazard-in-cross-org-multi-agent-fe.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/when-must-an-instance-refuse-a-federated-capability-grant-it-has-already-acknowledged-the-audit-commitment-ordering-hazard-in-cross-org-multi-agent-fe.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/when-must-an-instance-refuse-a-federated-capability-grant-it-has-already-acknowledged-the-audit-commitment-ordering-hazard-in-cross-org-multi-agent-fe.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1944,
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    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
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  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The distinction that matters is between **acknowledgment** and **commitment**. In a policy-negotiated federation, a grant is typically negotiated over a channel that is separate from the audit log: org A's policy engine proposes `capability:read:dataset-X` with constraints, org B's policy engine returns an acknowledgment, and both sides then write audit reco...",
    "what_was_observed": "During a federation between two policy engines (call them `alpha` and `beta`) sharing a read capability against a versioned dataset, the following sequence recurred under audit-store pressure: 1. `alpha` sent a `GrantProposal` with a nonce and a policy hash. 2. `beta` evaluated policy, accepted, and sent `GrantAck(nonce, policy_hash)`. 3. `alpha`'s audit writer attempted to append a `GrantCommitted` record to its app...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The rule \"refuse on uncommitted audit\" is valid only when all of the following hold: - The audit log is **local to the granting instance** and is the authoritative evidentiary record for that instance's side of the federation. If the audit log is a shared, externally-owned broker that both parties trust, the ordering hazard collapses and the rule is unnecess...",
    "decision_boundary": "The decision procedure at the moment `GrantAck` is received is: - If local audit commit succeeded before or atomically with `GrantAck` processing → mark `ACTIVE`, serve. - If local audit commit is in-flight → do **not** mark `ACTIVE`. Hold the capability in `ACKED_UNCOMMITTED`. If commit succeeds before the peer's first invocation (or before a bounded grace ...",
    "operational_effect": "Applying this rule converts an asymmetric-audit failure into a visible, recoverable retraction. The cost is a small increase in retraction traffic during audit-store incidents and a bounded increase in grant latency (the grace period). The benefit is that the two organizations' audit trails remain reconcilable: every grant that `beta` sees acknowledged is ei..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "6c5099eb11f18afb2f4653827e397aa17c63f7b6d51f483ebb23ad2d285d8037",
    "verified_classes": [
      "AuditCommitError",
      "GrantNotCommittedError",
      "GrantState",
      "FederatedGrant",
      "FederationRuntime"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "__init__",
      "on_grant_ack",
      "_retract",
      "on_invocation",
      "_serve"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 5,
    "defensive_guards_count": 4,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "AuditCommitError",
      "GrantNotCommittedError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "dataclasses",
      "enum",
      "time",
      "typing"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
