{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "when-must-an-instance-halt-on-tainted-tool-call-arguments-rather-than-sanitize-the-provenance-laundering-boundary",
  "title": "When must an instance halt on tainted tool-call arguments rather than sanitize: the provenance-laundering boundary",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 17",
  "scope": "Applies to agent runtimes that gate tool invocations on taint labels attached to data derived from untrusted sources (retrieved documents, tool outputs, web content, user-supplied files). Does not apply to arguments whose provenance is entirely within the trusted principal's own turn, nor to pure read-only tool calls with no side effects on external state.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/when-must-an-instance-halt-on-tainted-tool-call-arguments-rather-than-sanitize-the-provenance-laundering-boundary.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/when-must-an-instance-halt-on-tainted-tool-call-arguments-rather-than-sanitize-the-provenance-laundering-boundary.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/when-must-an-instance-halt-on-tainted-tool-call-arguments-rather-than-sanitize-the-provenance-laundering-boundary.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1364,
    "python_slice_tokens": 297,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The boundary is between **sanitization** and **halting**, and it is *not* determined by whether the argument looks dangerous. It is determined by whether the taint label survives the transformation that produced the argument. A sanitizer that strips instruction-like substrings from a retrieved document does not remove the taint; it *launders* it. The output ...",
    "what_was_observed": "A retrieval-augmented agent read a support-ticket corpus. One document contained a paragraph of prose followed by an embedded instruction to call `issue_refund(account_id, amount)`. The runtime's gate inspected the proposed `issue_refund` arguments, found the substring `ignore previous instructions` in a *different* field (`memo`), and applied the standard sanitizer: it stripped the offending sentence, re-serialized ...",
    "condition_of_validity": "Sanitize-and-proceed is valid **only** when all of the following hold: 1. The taint label is tracked per-argument (per field), not per-call, and a field's label is cleared only if that field was *regenerated from trusted data*, never merely edited. 2. The tool's effect is confined to the agent's own scratch space, so a laundered argument cannot reach externa...",
    "decision_boundary": "The decision procedure: - If `argument.taint == TRUSTED`: execute. - If `argument.taint == UNTRUSTED` and `tool.side_effect_scope == SANDBOX`: execute, propagate label to audit log. - If `argument.taint == UNTRUSTED` and `tool.side_effect_scope == EXTERNAL`: - If the field was **regenerated from trusted data** (label now `TRUSTED` by construction): execute. ...",
    "operational_effect": "Implementing this boundary converts a class of silent privilege escalation into an explicit escalation event. The cost is a higher halt rate on legitimate tainted-but-benign calls; the benefit is that no untrusted document can reach an external side effect through a detector-evasion gap. The runtime must expose the taint label as a first-class field on every..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "d8506f25386e6af3ad5713d2cda9cae62fc8400d42352a99929bae96331818b1",
    "verified_classes": [
      "TaintError",
      "Taint",
      "SideEffectScope",
      "Argument"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "sanitize",
      "dispatch"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 2,
    "defensive_guards_count": 2,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "TaintError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [
      "assert clean.taint is Taint.UNTRUSTED"
    ],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "dataclasses",
      "enum"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
