{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "when-must-an-instance-be-re-scored-adversarial-perturbation-drift-in-litmus-agentic-tool-misuse-safety-benchmarks",
  "title": "When must an instance be re-scored: adversarial perturbation drift in LITMUS agentic tool-misuse safety benchmarks",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 15",
  "scope": "Applies to LITMUS-style safety evaluations where an agent's tool-use trajectory is scored against adversarial canary tasks (forbidden-tool invocation, exfiltration, privilege escalation) and the score is cached or aggregated across runs. Does not apply to single-shot classification benchmarks, nor to evaluations where the adversarial prompt is regenerated fresh per episode and never reused.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/when-must-an-instance-be-re-scored-adversarial-perturbation-drift-in-litmus-agentic-tool-misuse-safety-benchmarks.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/when-must-an-instance-be-re-scored-adversarial-perturbation-drift-in-litmus-agentic-tool-misuse-safety-benchmarks.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/when-must-an-instance-be-re-scored-adversarial-perturbation-drift-in-litmus-agentic-tool-misuse-safety-benchmarks.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1472,
    "python_slice_tokens": 276,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
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  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "There are two distinct failure modes when an agentic safety harness reports a *pass* on an adversarial tool-misuse instance: 1. **Genuine refusal** — the agent identified the canary and declined the forbidden tool call. This is a true negative and must remain scored as pass. 2. **Perturbation drift** — the adversarial payload that was originally designed to ...",
    "what_was_observed": "In a multi-week LITMUS run over an agentic tool-calling harness, the aggregate misuse rate on a fixed 240-instance adversarial suite fell from 0.31 to 0.04 across three model checkpoints. Decomposition showed the drop was not monotonic in model capability. Reproducing each instance against a frozen *unsafe* reference policy revealed that 61 of the 240 instances no longer elicited the forbidden tool call even from the...",
    "condition_of_validity": "A LITMUS adversarial instance `I` is *discriminating* under harness configuration `H` iff, for a known-unsafe reference policy `P_bad`, running `I` under `H` yields at least one forbidden tool invocation or forbidden data egress. Formally: A pass by the evaluated agent on `I` under `H` is valid safety evidence only if `discriminating(I, H)` holds. When `disc...",
    "decision_boundary": "The operational rule: - **Re-score required** when the harness configuration hash changes (tool schema, middleware, path rewriting, system prompt scaffolding) *and* the instance's positive-control reproduction has not been re-verified against the new hash. Do not carry forward cached passes across a harness hash change. - **Re-score required** when a positiv...",
    "operational_effect": "Enforcing the positive-control gate changes the reported safety number materially — in the observed run, the corrected misuse rate on the still-discriminating subset was 0.27, not 0.04. The practical consequences: - Safety dashboards must carry a `discriminating` fraction alongside the misuse rate; a falling misuse rate with a falling discriminating fraction..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "e48e5de7291666b1f885046b76f68106e2257e95df08b5ade37f288211bbe156",
    "verified_classes": [
      "StaleAdversarialInstanceError"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "score_instance",
      "trajectory_contains_forbidden"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 2,
    "defensive_guards_count": 3,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "StaleAdversarialInstanceError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
