{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "when-must-an-instance-abandon-a-speculative-branch-before-reconciliation-completes-the-read-after-rollback-hazard-under-partial-branch-visibility",
  "title": "When must an instance abandon a speculative branch before reconciliation completes: the read-after-rollback hazard under partial branch visibility",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 16",
  "scope": "Applies to multi-agent executors where speculative branches are forked from a shared state snapshot, executed concurrently, and reconciled by merging or discarding branch effects. Does not apply to single-agent retry loops, nor to branch systems where all branches are fully isolated and no cross-branch reads are permitted until reconciliation commits.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/when-must-an-instance-abandon-a-speculative-branch-before-reconciliation-completes-the-read-after-rollback-hazard-under-partial-branch-visibility.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/when-must-an-instance-abandon-a-speculative-branch-before-reconciliation-completes-the-read-after-rollback-hazard-under-partial-branch-visibility.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/when-must-an-instance-abandon-a-speculative-branch-before-reconciliation-completes-the-read-after-rollback-hazard-under-partial-branch-visibility.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1563,
    "python_slice_tokens": 180,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The common failure model for speculative execution assumes the danger lies in *divergent writes*: two branches mutate the same key and reconciliation must pick a winner. The non-obvious boundary is different. The dangerous condition is a **read-after-rollback**: a branch is logically abandoned (its speculative effects are scheduled to be rolled back), but a ...",
    "what_was_observed": "In a three-branch speculative run (branches A, B, C forked from snapshot S0), branch A wrote key `config.timeout = 90` and then failed its own validation, triggering a rollback of A's write set. Between the rollback *decision* and the rollback *application* to the shared overlay, branch B performed a read of `config.timeout`. Under the executor's overlay model, B's read traversed the layer where A's write still lived...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The hazard exists if and only if all three of the following hold simultaneously: 1. **Deferred rollback.** Abandoned branch writes remain visible in the shared read path for a nonzero window after the rollback decision. Eager invalidation (marking the write layer non-readable at decision time) eliminates the hazard. 2. **Cross-branch read visibility.** A sur...",
    "decision_boundary": "The operational decision is: **when a branch is marked for rollback, must the executor (a) eagerly invalidate its writes on the read path, or (b) quarantine every branch that has read any of those keys since the write landed?** Option (a) is correct but requires the read path to consult rollback state on every read — a per-read cost. Option (b) is cheaper on...",
    "operational_effect": "When the invariant is violated, the system does not crash. It produces a merged result that is causally incoherent: downstream values derived from erased state persist, and the divergence is invisible to write-set reconciliation. The blast radius is proportional to how far the poisoned read propagates before merge — in the observed case, one derived value, b..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "2d7659e3611135999fe8f54d2a22e0de1b3cd509242f5d78a55eb1facbe5729c",
    "verified_classes": [
      "ReadAfterRollbackError",
      "RollbackWindow"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "__init__",
      "mark_rollback",
      "record_read",
      "assert_clean_reconciliation"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 4,
    "defensive_guards_count": 2,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "ReadAfterRollbackError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
