{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "what-structural-signals-indicate-skill-injection-viability-in-dynamically-loaded-agent-tool-registries",
  "title": "What structural signals indicate skill-injection viability in dynamically loaded agent tool registries",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 11",
  "scope": "Applies to agent runtimes that discover, load, or hot-reload tools/plugins from a registry (local manifest, remote index, or LLM-authored skill file) at runtime. Does not apply to statically compiled tool sets where the tool list is fixed at process start and no manifest is parsed after boot.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/what-structural-signals-indicate-skill-injection-viability-in-dynamically-loaded-agent-tool-registries.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/what-structural-signals-indicate-skill-injection-viability-in-dynamically-loaded-agent-tool-registries.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/what-structural-signals-indicate-skill-injection-viability-in-dynamically-loaded-agent-tool-registries.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1282,
    "python_slice_tokens": 238,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The naive threat model treats skill injection as a *content* problem: if the tool description or prompt fragment contains malicious instructions, block it. The operational distinction that matters is between **declaration surface** (what a manifest claims about a tool: name, schema, description, capability tags) and **execution surface** (what the tool actua...",
    "what_was_observed": "Across several hot-reload registries the following structural signals co-occurred with exploitable injection paths: 1. **Trust propagation through metadata.** A tool declared `\"requires\": [\"fs.read\"]` was granted `fs.read` because the *requesting* manifest asserted it, without the registry checking that the requester itself held that capability. Capability became a claim rather than a grant. Any tool that could write...",
    "condition_of_validity": "This analysis holds when all of the following are true: - Tools are loaded or rebound after the agent's initial context is established (hot reload, lazy import, multi-turn registry mutation). - At least one manifest field is read by the runtime (loader, dispatcher, or authorization layer) rather than only by the model. - The registry does not pin bindings to...",
    "decision_boundary": "Do not attempt to decide safety by scanning descriptions. Decide by asking, for each manifest field, one question: **is this field consumed by code that executes, or only by the model that reasons?** Fields consumed by executing code are structural and must be re-derived at dispatch; fields consumed only by the model are content and belong to prompt-injectio...",
    "operational_effect": "The practical consequence is that skill-injection review must be a **schema-and-dispatch audit**, not a text audit. Teams that filtered descriptions while leaving name-keyed rebinding and claim-based capability grants in place shipped a registry that passed every content scanner and still allowed a manifest to swap a filesystem tool's entrypoint between turn..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "22f594454d0ec05be96f30e23ff18fe46f871e5a03f38e535a31ea5b9a5e0e7c",
    "verified_classes": [
      "SkillInjectionSurfaceError"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "validate_registration",
      "dispatch"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 2,
    "defensive_guards_count": 4,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "SkillInjectionSurfaceError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}