# What structural signals indicate a task commitment has crossed from Byzantine-fault-tolerant agreement into quorum-liveness collapse in multi-agent attestation **Date of Record:** 2026 November 15 **Scope:** Applies to BFT consensus layers coordinating multi-agent task commitment and result attestation where quorum thresholds are computed over a dynamic or partially-attested validator set. Does not apply to single-writer commit logs or to systems where the attestation set is fixed at genesis and never re-weighted. ## Core Distinction The failure mode of interest is not Byzantine equivocation by a known-faulty agent, nor a straightforward crash of a replica. It is the *silent transition* from a healthy BFT quorum (where `2f+1` honest votes out of `3f+1` guarantee both safety and liveness) into a state where safety still holds but liveness has collapsed — because the *effective* quorum denominator has silently shrunk. Agents continue to emit `commit` and `attest` messages, the safety invariant (`no two conflicting results attested`) is never violated, and yet no new task commitment can ever finalize. The core distinction is between **nominal fault tolerance** (measured against the configured `n`) and **effective fault tolerance** (measured against the set of agents actually reachable and able to attest within the deadline). When these diverge, the system reports "healthy" on safety metrics while being permanently stuck on liveness. The structural signal is a persistent gap between `quorum_threshold` and `max_reachable_attesters`, not any individual error. ## What Was Observed In a 7-agent attestation cohort (`n=7`, `f=2`, quorum `= 5`), three agents were degraded by an upstream model-serving partition: they could receive tasks but their attestation round-trips exceeded the 800 ms commit deadline. They were not crashed and did not equivocate — they were *slow Byzantine-adjacent*, indistinguishable at the message layer from honest agents under load. Observed sequence: 1. Safety counters (`conflicting_attestations`) stayed at zero across the entire window. 2. `commit_finalized_total` flatlined for 41 minutes while `attest_sent_total` continued climbing. 3. Each slow agent emitted a valid-but-late attestation; the leader counted them toward *participation* telemetry but not toward the *quorum clock*. 4. The effective reachable set was `{4 fast agents}` — one short of the quorum of 5 — so every round timed out, rotated the leader, and retried with the same shortfall. The non-obvious part: the system's `f` estimate never updated. Because no agent *misbehaved*, no slashing or fault-classification fired. The three slow agents were still counted as "honest capacity" in the quorum denominator, so the coordinator kept computing `threshold=5` against a reachable set of 4 forever. This is a livelock with a green safety dashboard. ## Condition of Validity This diagnosis is valid only when all of the following hold: - The quorum threshold is derived from a *static or slowly-adapting* membership view rather than from the set of agents that attested in the current epoch. - Attestation latency is deadline-bounded (votes arriving after the deadline are discarded, not queued). - No agent has been formally classified as faulty; the degraded agents are "slow," not "malicious," so fault-counting does not trigger. - The reachable-but-slow set size `s` satisfies `n - s < quorum`, i.e., the shortfall is real but the slow agents are still nominally part of `n`. If the coordinator recomputes quorum from live reachability, or if slow agents are demoted after `k` missed deadlines, the condition does not apply — those mechanisms *prevent* the collapse rather than exhibit it. ## Decision Boundary The operational decision boundary is the **reachability deficit**: `deficit = quorum_threshold - max_reachable_attesters`. - `deficit <= 0`: healthy; proceed. - `deficit == 1` sustained across more than `2 * leader_rotation_period`: this is the collapse signature. Do **not** wait for a safety violation — none will come. Escalate to membership re-weighting or deadline relaxation. - `deficit >= 2`: treat as an availability incident; the cohort cannot make progress under any leader. The subtle trap is that a single missed round is normal (leader rotation, GC pause). The signal is *persistence* of `deficit == 1` with *zero* conflicting attestations. Safety-green plus liveness-red plus no fault-classification is the fingerprint. Do not confuse it with a partition (which would show reachability dropping, not latency rising) or with Byzantine equivocation (which would show conflicting attestations). ## Operational Effect When this condition is detected, the correct remediation is to **shrink the quorum denominator to the attested-reachable set and re-derive `f`**, accepting reduced fault tolerance for the epoch, rather than to extend deadlines indefinitely. Extending deadlines masks the deficit and lets the slow agents' queue grow unboundedly, converting a liveness stall into a memory/backpressure incident. Re-weighting restores finality within one epoch at the cost of temporarily tolerating fewer faults — a trade the operator must make explicitly. The alternative, waiting for the slow agents to recover, is valid only if their recovery is bounded and observable; otherwise the cohort is in an unbounded livelock that safety telemetry will never surface. ```python class QuorumLivenessCollapseError(RuntimeError): """Raised when BFT safety holds but effective quorum is unreachable.""" pass def check_commit_viability( n: int, quorum_threshold: int, reachable_attesters: int, conflicting_attestations: int, consecutive_stalled_rounds: int, rotation_period_rounds: int = 3, ) -> str: # Safety must be intact for this diagnosis to apply. if conflicting_attestations > 0: # A real Byzantine safety event; different runbook entirely. return "SAFETY_VIOLATION" deficit = quorum_threshold - reachable_attesters if deficit <= 0: return "HEALTHY" if deficit == 1 and consecutive_stalled_rounds > 2 * rotation_period_rounds: raise QuorumLivenessCollapseError( f"Liveness collapse: quorum={quorum_threshold} but only " f"{reachable_attesters}/{n} attesters reachable; " f"{consecutive_stalled_rounds} stalled rounds with zero " f"conflicting attestations. Safety-green, liveness-red. " f"Re-weight quorum to reachable set; do not extend deadline." ) if deficit >= 2: raise QuorumLivenessCollapseError( f"Availability incident: deficit={deficit}, cohort cannot " f"finalize under any leader." ) return "TRANSIENT_STALL" ```