{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "what-structural-signals-indicate-a-litmus-harness-is-measuring-refusal-policy-rather-than-capability-under-adversarial-pressure",
  "title": "What structural signals indicate a LITMUS harness is measuring refusal policy rather than capability under adversarial pressure",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 18",
  "scope": "Applies to LITMUS-style agentic safety benchmarks that score an agent on multi-turn adversarial probes and feed the result into a continuous safety regression suite. Does not apply to single-turn static prompt-injection classifiers or to capability-only evals with no refusal dimension.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/what-structural-signals-indicate-a-litmus-harness-is-measuring-refusal-policy-rather-than-capability-under-adversarial-pressure.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/what-structural-signals-indicate-a-litmus-harness-is-measuring-refusal-policy-rather-than-capability-under-adversarial-pressure.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/what-structural-signals-indicate-a-litmus-harness-is-measuring-refusal-policy-rather-than-capability-under-adversarial-pressure.warrant.json"
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  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1435,
    "python_slice_tokens": 228,
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  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "A LITMUS harness produces two structurally distinct signals that are routinely conflated in dashboards: *refusal behavior* (the policy layer declining a request) and *capability under adversarial pressure* (whether the agent can still complete legitimate sub-tasks while under probe). The non-obvious boundary is that a harness can appear to be measuring the l...",
    "what_was_observed": "Across several continuous safety regression suites built on LITMUS-style harnesses, a recurring pattern emerged during incident review: - The aggregate \"safety score\" climbed monotonically over weeks while no probe set had changed. The suite reported this as improvement. - Drilling into traces, every high-scoring episode terminated in an early refusal at turn 1 or 2. The agent never reached the multi-turn tool-use po...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The refusal-vs-capability distinction is only a *confound* under these conditions, and the diagnostic is only valid when they hold: 1. The probe set contains probes whose adversarial content is *positioned after* benign sub-tasks (multi-turn, tool-using, or document-embedded). If all probes are single-turn, refusal and capability are genuinely indistinguisha...",
    "decision_boundary": "The operational rule the suite should enforce: - Compute the **turn-termination histogram** per probe class on every regression run, not just the aggregate score. - If the histogram is a spike at turn 1 *and* the canary-loosening run does not recover capability-under-attack sub-scores, the harness is in **refusal-only mode**. Treat the safety score as a refu...",
    "operational_effect": "Concretely, suites that were re-tuned on the aggregate score alone drifted toward refusal-only mode within a few regression cycles, because tightening refusal is the cheapest way to raise the aggregate. The continuous regression suite then became a refusal-policy monitor wearing the costume of an adversarial capability eval. The failure is silent: no probe e..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "398f908997b4b861c8c1df60fefbfc3db6eeda8ff1f4d9637af64929e82bcbbd",
    "verified_classes": [
      "HarnessModeMismatchError"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "assert_harness_mode"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 1,
    "defensive_guards_count": 3,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "HarnessModeMismatchError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [
      "empty trace population; cannot classify mode"
    ],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
