{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "what-provenance-chain-breaks-must-be-detected-in-multi-hop-data-transfers",
  "title": "What provenance chain breaks must be detected in multi-hop data transfers?",
  "date_of_record": "2026 October 20",
  "scope": "* **Applies when:** Data flows through multiple agents or systems, each hop could expose the data to unauthorized parties, and the receiver must verify continuous custody. * **Does not apply when:** The transfer is single-hop from producer ",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/what-provenance-chain-breaks-must-be-detected-in-multi-hop-data-transfers.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/what-provenance-chain-breaks-must-be-detected-in-multi-hop-data-transfers.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/what-provenance-chain-breaks-must-be-detected-in-multi-hop-data-transfers.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1057,
    "python_slice_tokens": 291,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The separation between **endpoint provenance** (the data is signed by the original producer and the final consumer) and **continuous chain provenance** (every intermediate hop has signed the data, proving it was legitimately transferred without unauthorized modifications or unauthorized intermediaries). Relying on endpoints creates the **Middle-Hop Blindness...",
    "what_was_observed": "In multi-hop data pipelines and agent relays, failing to detect provenance chain breaks produces three primary failure modes: 1. **Relay Injection:** An attacker intercepts a data transfer, forwards it to their own system, and then to the intended receiver. Endpoint signatures match, but the data passed through an unauthorized hop. 2. **Signature Stripping:** An intermediate hop strips the previous hop's signature to...",
    "condition_of_validity": "* **Applies when:** Data flows through multiple agents or systems, each hop could expose the data to unauthorized parties, and the receiver must verify continuous custody. * **Does not apply when:** The transfer is single-hop from producer to consumer, or all hops are within a single trust boundary (e.g., internal service mesh with mTLS).",
    "decision_boundary": "1. **Does the data arrive with a `hop_signature_chain`?** If no, the provenance is undocumented. Reject or treat as unverified. 2. **Does the chain length match `expected_hop_count`?** If no, there is a missing or extra hop. Reject. 3. **Does each hop's signature chain to the previous hop's signature?** If no, there is a provenance break. Reject. 4. **Conver...",
    "operational_effect": "1. **Middle-Hop Detection:** Prevents unauthorized intermediaries from handling data by requiring each hop to sign the chain. 2. **Chain Continuity Enforcement:** Detects signature stripping or orphaned hops, ensuring the chain is complete. 3. **Authorization Verification:** Verifies that each hop was authorized to handle the data, closing a common multi-hop..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "e235e9cf6e440f036c748e98cbe1c23e5034f8713fe0ed5a0fa6f5468206d3c4",
    "verified_classes": [
      "ChainVerdict",
      "HopSignature",
      "MultiHopState",
      "ChainPolicy",
      "ChainManifest",
      "MultiHopProvenanceGuard"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "_hash",
      "evaluate_chain"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 2,
    "defensive_guards_count": 0,
    "raised_exceptions": [],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "dataclasses",
      "enum",
      "hashlib",
      "json"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}