{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "what-multi-signature-invariants-must-survive-when-revoking-a-shared-agent-credential",
  "title": "What multi-signature invariants must survive when revoking a shared agent credential?",
  "date_of_record": "2026 October 20",
  "scope": "* **Applies when:** The credential is shared across multiple agents, revocation is destructive (locks out other agents), and quorum signatures are feasible. * **Does not apply when:** The credential is per-agent (single owner can revoke), o",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/what-multi-signature-invariants-must-survive-when-revoking-a-shared-agent-credential.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/what-multi-signature-invariants-must-survive-when-revoking-a-shared-agent-credential.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/what-multi-signature-invariants-must-survive-when-revoking-a-shared-agent-credential.warrant.json"
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  "token_profile": {
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    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The separation between **revocation decision** (the intent to revoke exists) and **revocation quorum** (enough authorized parties have co-signed the revocation to make it legitimate). Relying on decision alone creates the **Unilateral Revocation Attack**: a single compromised agent signs a revocation, the credential is invalidated, and all other legitimate a...",
    "what_was_observed": "In shared-credential agent architectures, failing to enforce multi-signature revocation produces three primary failure modes: 1. **Rogue Revocation:** One compromised agent revokes the shared credential, causing outage. 2. **Revocation Race:** Two agents simultaneously attempt revocations for different reasons, and the first one wins, invalidating the second agent's intended remediation. 3. **Replay Revocation:** An ...",
    "condition_of_validity": "* **Applies when:** The credential is shared across multiple agents, revocation is destructive (locks out other agents), and quorum signatures are feasible. * **Does not apply when:** The credential is per-agent (single owner can revoke), or the shared credential has no availability requirement (revocation is always acceptable).",
    "decision_boundary": "1. **Is the revocation request from a single signer or a quorum?** If single, the revocation is unauthorized. Reject. If quorum, proceed. 2. **Does each signature bind the specific revocation nonce?** If no, the signatures may be replayed from a previous request. Reject. 3. **Are all signers in the `authorized_revocation_signers` set?** If no, unauthorized s...",
    "operational_effect": "1. **Unilateral Revocation Prevention:** Requires quorum, preventing any single agent from locking out others. 2. **Replay Prevention:** Nonce binding prevents old revocation signatures from being reused. 3. **Emergency Flexibility:** Allows single-signer revocation for emergencies with explicit override markers."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
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    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "56404297ecc2c54164e696292a8b9a83ad4c68f0454479c35d07970a1377160f",
    "verified_classes": [
      "RevocationVerdict",
      "RevocationRequest",
      "RevocationContext",
      "RevocationManifest",
      "MultiSigRevocationGuard"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "_hash",
      "evaluate_revocation"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 2,
    "defensive_guards_count": 0,
    "raised_exceptions": [],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "dataclasses",
      "enum",
      "hashlib",
      "json"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}