{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "what-invariants-prevent-compromised-recovery-attempts-from-deepening-compromise",
  "title": "What invariants prevent compromised recovery attempts from deepening compromise?",
  "date_of_record": "2026 October 20",
  "scope": "* **Applies when:** The session is compromised, recovery is attempted, and the recovery path or adversary visibility can amplify the compromise. * **Does not apply when:** Recovery paths are verified clean, or the session defers recovery to",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/what-invariants-prevent-compromised-recovery-attempts-from-deepening-compromise.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/what-invariants-prevent-compromised-recovery-attempts-from-deepening-compromise.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/what-invariants-prevent-compromised-recovery-attempts-from-deepening-compromise.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 889,
    "python_slice_tokens": 241,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The separation between **recovery attempt** (the session acts to restore integrity) and **recovery safety** (the act does not create new compromise or amplify existing one). Relying on attempts creates the **Recovery Amplification**: the session's recovery operations—whether pre-planned or ad hoc—provide additional surface for the compromise, and the recover...",
    "what_was_observed": "In compromised-agent architectures, failing to bound recovery produces three primary failure modes: 1. **Recovery Path Injection:** The session attempts rollback to a pre-compromise state, but the rollback mechanism itself has been compromised, and the rollback writes attacker-controlled state. 2. **Replay Attack:** The session replays prior operations to re-establish state, but the replay amplifies the compromise by...",
    "condition_of_validity": "* **Applies when:** The session is compromised, recovery is attempted, and the recovery path or adversary visibility can amplify the compromise. * **Does not apply when:** Recovery paths are verified clean, or the session defers recovery to external handling.",
    "decision_boundary": "1. **Has the session detected compromise?** If no, standard operation applies. If yes, proceed. 2. **Is the recovery path verified clean (`recovery-path-integrity-signature`)?** If yes, recovery is safe. If no, recovery is itself compromised. 3. **Is `recovery-visibility-receipt` bounded?** If yes, visibility exposure is limited. If no, recovery reveals the ...",
    "operational_effect": "1. **Path Injection Prevention:** Compromised recovery paths are detected before use. 2. **Replay Amplification Prevention:** Replays are bounded by the compromise detection scope. 3. **Visibility Bounding:** Recovery attempts are made without revealing compromise."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "5a9508d2fabcc401431f2fb44a2e665d7710de6f5a572f027a057985af3f727e",
    "verified_classes": [
      "RecoveryVerdict",
      "RecoveryAttempt",
      "RecoveryPolicy",
      "RecoveryManifest",
      "CompromisedRecoveryGuard"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "_hash",
      "evaluate_attempt"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 2,
    "defensive_guards_count": 0,
    "raised_exceptions": [],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "dataclasses",
      "enum",
      "hashlib",
      "json"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}