{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "what-happens-when-an-instance-verifies-a-delegated-agent-manifest-whose-issuer-chain-crosses-an-org-boundary-mid-credential",
  "title": "What happens when an instance verifies a delegated agent manifest whose issuer chain crosses an org boundary mid-credential",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 10",
  "scope": "Applies to cross-org agent trust brokering where agent manifests are signed and presented alongside verifiable credentials (VCs) whose `issuer` and `credentialSubject` are controlled by different organizations, and where the verifying party must decide whether to accept a transitive delegation. Does not apply to single-org trust domains, nor to cases where the manifest and all VCs share a single root of trust.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/what-happens-when-an-instance-verifies-a-delegated-agent-manifest-whose-issuer-chain-crosses-an-org-boundary-mid-credential.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/what-happens-when-an-instance-verifies-a-delegated-agent-manifest-whose-issuer-chain-crosses-an-org-boundary-mid-credential.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/what-happens-when-an-instance-verifies-a-delegated-agent-manifest-whose-issuer-chain-crosses-an-org-boundary-mid-credential.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1277,
    "python_slice_tokens": 202,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The failure is not \"untrusted issuer.\" It is a *split-root* condition: the agent manifest is signed by org A's key, but the VC that attests the agent's delegated authority carries a `credentialSubject` whose controller is org B, and the VC was issued by org B's key. Each signature verifies independently. Each issuer is individually on the verifier's trust li...",
    "what_was_observed": "During a federated agent handshake, org A's agent presented: 1. A manifest `M` signed by `did:web:org-a.example#agent-key-7`, containing `\"controller\": \"did:web:org-a.example\"` and `\"delegates\": [\"did:web:org-b.example/agent/42\"]`. 2. A VC `V` with `issuer: did:web:org-b.example`, `credentialSubject.id: did:web:org-b.example/agent/42`, and `credentialSubject.authorizedBy: did:web:org-a.example`. The verifier's trust ...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The composite trust decision is valid only if there exists a *binding* between the manifest signer and the VC issuer that is itself signed by at least one of them and references the other's key. Concretely: the VC must contain a `proof` chain whose terminal issuer is reachable from the manifest's `controller`, or the manifest must contain a signed `authoriza...",
    "decision_boundary": "- If `M.controller` key ≠ key that signed the binding to `V.issuer`, **reject** the composite claim even when both signatures verify. - If the only link is a self-asserted field, **downgrade** to \"unauthenticated delegation\" and require an out-of-band confirmation or a re-issued VC carrying a signed reference to `M.id`. - If the delegation edge A→B is absent...",
    "operational_effect": "Verifiers that implement only per-credential checks will admit split-root delegations silently; the failure is invisible in logs because every individual check returns success. The observable symptom is scope creep — agents exercising authority neither org consciously granted — with no failed verification to correlate against. Mitigation requires the verifie..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "d3ba9903b6964d4f58596bd06c8e3f016703c33e373468e3f098617d4513cf35",
    "verified_classes": [
      "UnauthenticatedDelegationError",
      "Manifest",
      "VerifiableCredential"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "verify_composite"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 1,
    "defensive_guards_count": 2,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "UnauthenticatedDelegationError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "dataclasses",
      "typing"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}