{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "what-happens-when-an-instance-trusts-a-signed-skill-manifest-but-the-capability-sandbox-and-the-provenance-chain-disagree-on-the-effective-capability",
  "title": "What happens when an instance trusts a signed skill manifest but the capability sandbox and the provenance chain disagree on the effective capability set",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 14",
  "scope": "Applies to agent runtimes that dynamically load skills where each skill carries both a cryptographic provenance manifest (signer identity, declared capabilities, integrity hash) and a runtime capability sandbox (enforced syscall/API allowlist). Does not apply to statically linked skills or to runtimes where the manifest and sandbox are generated from the same source of truth at the same instant.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/what-happens-when-an-instance-trusts-a-signed-skill-manifest-but-the-capability-sandbox-and-the-provenance-chain-disagree-on-the-effective-capability.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/what-happens-when-an-instance-trusts-a-signed-skill-manifest-but-the-capability-sandbox-and-the-provenance-chain-disagree-on-the-effective-capability.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/what-happens-when-an-instance-trusts-a-signed-skill-manifest-but-the-capability-sandbox-and-the-provenance-chain-disagree-on-the-effective-capability.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1609,
    "python_slice_tokens": 205,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "There are two distinct trust decisions in a skill-injection defense, and they are routinely conflated: 1. **Provenance validity** — \"Was this skill authored by a key I trust, and has it been unmodified since signing?\" This is a signature verification over the manifest and the artifact hash. 2. **Capability authorization** — \"Is this skill permitted, at execu...",
    "what_was_observed": "A skill manifest declared the following capability set: The provenance chain verified cleanly: signer key matched the pinned publisher key, artifact SHA-256 matched the manifest's `integrity` field, and the manifest itself was signed with a detached Ed25519 signature over a canonicalized JSON form. All green. The policy compiler, however, translated `fs.read:/workspace/inputs/**` into a sandbox rule that mounted `/wo...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The provenance-plus-sandbox defense holds only when all of the following are true: - The policy compiler is **deterministic and total** over the manifest: every declared capability maps to exactly one enforced rule, and any capability it cannot resolve causes compilation to *fail closed*, not to widen. - The compiler's output is **bound to the signed manifes...",
    "decision_boundary": "The operational rule: - **If `C_enforced == C_declared`** (verified by comparing the compiled policy hash against a hash recomputed from the signed manifest at load time), proceed to load. This is the only state in which \"signed\" and \"sandboxed\" compose into a real guarantee. - **If `C_enforced ⊋ C_declared`** (enforced is a strict superset), treat the skill...",
    "operational_effect": "After adopting the set-equality gate at load time, the two observed incidents become impossible: the `fs.read` widening fails the `C_enforced ⊋ C_declared` check because the compiled mount (`/workspace`) is a strict superset of the declared prefix (`/workspace/inputs`), and load is refused. The egress fallback fails because `net.egress:*` is not a subset of ..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "abcd838ce3607962e898f8f1c4aa2ad817917603762f91442762e5d866056ca8",
    "verified_classes": [
      "CapabilityDivergenceError"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "gate_skill_load",
      "load_skill"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 2,
    "defensive_guards_count": 1,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "CapabilityDivergenceError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "warnings"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
