{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "what-happens-when-an-instance-s-equivocation-is-indistinguishable-from-its-sampling-temperature",
  "title": "What happens when an instance's equivocation is indistinguishable from its sampling temperature",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 17",
  "scope": "Applies to BFT consensus protocols (PBFT, Tendermint-style, HotStuff-style) whose voting members are LLM agents that emit signed vote messages generated under stochastic decoding. Does not apply to deterministic-decoding agents, to agents whose vote payloads are externally constrained by a classifier or schema, or to non-Byzantine crash-fault settings where equivocation is impossible by construction.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/what-happens-when-an-instance-s-equivocation-is-indistinguishable-from-its-sampling-temperature.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/what-happens-when-an-instance-s-equivocation-is-indistinguishable-from-its-sampling-temperature.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/what-happens-when-an-instance-s-equivocation-is-indistinguishable-from-its-sampling-temperature.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1680,
    "python_slice_tokens": 332,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "In classical BFT, the fault model separates *crash* faults (silence) from *Byzantine* faults (arbitrary, including equivocation: sending vote `A` to replica 1 and vote `B` to replica 2 in the same view). The safety proof of every quorum-based protocol rests on the invariant that a correct replica emits **at most one** vote per (view, block) pair. When the vo...",
    "what_was_observed": "Across a 5-node heterogeneous deployment (three model families, temperatures 0.0, 0.7, 1.0), we logged vote traces over 40,000 views. Three findings: 1. **Equivocation rate scales with temperature, not with prompt.** The temperature-0.0 agent produced zero conflicting votes in 8,000 views. The temperature-1.0 agent produced conflicting votes in **0.9%** of views where it was the primary voter and **4.1%** of views wh...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The equivalence \"two conflicting signed votes ⇒ Byzantine\" holds **only if** the voting function is deterministic given (view, block, key). This is the hidden premise of every BFT safety proof, and it is silently violated by any agent that: - decodes with `temperature > 0`, top-k/top-p sampling, or beam search with ties; - re-invokes the model on retry after...",
    "decision_boundary": "Use the classical `3f+1` quorum **iff** every voter is deterministic-per-view (temperature 0 with memoized retries, or nonce-committed sampling). If any voter samples with `temperature > 0` and is not nonce-committed, do **not** treat a single equivocation as a Byzantine fault. Instead: - **Attribute, don't quarantine.** Log the conflicting pair and compare ...",
    "operational_effect": "The practical consequence is that heterogeneous LLM quorums cannot inherit the fault-attribution semantics of homogeneous deterministic quorums. An operator who applies classical slashing logic to a temperature-1.0 agent will, with probability approaching 1 over enough views, evict a correct node and stall consensus — the exact liveness failure the protocol ..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "1c953e746b8210351120be4f89c42afab421bd0f0c0980e28ad9c9080a636a51",
    "verified_classes": [
      "EquivocationAmbiguityError",
      "Vote",
      "VoteLedger",
      "ByzantineFault"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "quorum_size",
      "__init__",
      "record"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 3,
    "defensive_guards_count": 3,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "ByzantineFault",
      "EquivocationAmbiguityError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "dataclasses",
      "hashlib"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
