# CorpusFetch Method Slice (Zero-Prose Python Stdlib Reference)
# Canonical Residual: https://corpusfetch.com/c/what-happens-when-an-instance-re-attests-mid-session-stale-peer-cache-poisoning-in-cross-domain-mutual-attestation.md
# Remnant Warrant:    https://corpusfetch.com/c/what-happens-when-an-instance-re-attests-mid-session-stale-peer-cache-poisoning-in-cross-domain-mutual-attestation.warrant.json
# Markdown SHA-256:   bc6300be86f8530194350772a0df2b8fbef137ed06b23e382e3d0fb6e16c0fa1
# Code AST SHA-256:   f8642102ac6dbef73edb4708bcd3e31a8675f996a63b895e5c9ca86f934069df
# Verified Classes:   StaleAttestationError, AttestationEvidence, CacheEntry, PeerAttestationCache
# Defensive Guards:   2 fail-closed invariants (zero external deps)

from __future__ import annotations

from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import Optional


class StaleAttestationError(RuntimeError):
    """Raised when a cached peer attestation no longer matches presented evidence."""


@dataclass(frozen=True)
class AttestationEvidence:
    workload_id: str          # stable name, e.g. spiffe://a/agent/worker
    svid_serial: str          # changes on every rotation
    bundle_version: str       # changes on trust-domain key roll
    measurement_digest: str   # changes on workload rebuild


@dataclass
class CacheEntry:
    evidence: AttestationEvidence
    admitted_at: float


class PeerAttestationCache:
    def __init__(self, ttl: float, svid_ttl: float) -> None:
        if ttl >= svid_ttl:
            raise ValueError(
                "peer cache TTL must be strictly less than SVID TTL; "
                "otherwise rotation is guaranteed to occur inside a live cache window"
            )
        self._ttl = ttl
        self._entries: dict[str, CacheEntry] = {}

    def admit(self, presented: AttestationEvidence, now: float) -> bool:
        entry = self._entries.get(presented.workload_id)
        if entry is None:
            self._entries[presented.workload_id] = CacheEntry(presented, now)
            return True

        # Evidence-change check takes precedence over TTL: a rotation is not
        # synchronized to our clock, so TTL alone cannot be trusted.
        if (
            entry.evidence.svid_serial != presented.svid_serial
            or entry.evidence.bundle_version != presented.bundle_version
            or entry.evidence.measurement_digest != presented.measurement_digest
        ):
            if now - entry.admitted_at >= self._ttl:
                # Expired entry: treat as fresh admission, not as an attack.
                self._entries[presented.workload_id] = CacheEntry(presented, now)
                return True
            raise StaleAttestationError(
                f"evidence changed for {presented.workload_id} inside cache window: "
                f"cached serial={entry.evidence.svid_serial} "
                f"bundle={entry.evidence.bundle_version} "
                f"presented serial={presented.svid_serial} "
                f"bundle={presented.bundle_version}; re-attest, do not reject"
            )

        if now - entry.admitted_at >= self._ttl:
            self._entries[presented.workload_id] = CacheEntry(presented, now)
        return True

    def invalidate_bundle(self, bundle_version: str) -> None:
        """Call on every bundle rotation, before accepting new connections."""
        self._entries = {
            k: v for k, v in self._entries.items()
            if v.evidence.bundle_version != bundle_version
        }
