{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "what-happens-when-an-instance-propagates-a-taint-label-across-a-tool-boundary-but-the-tool-re-serializes-its-output",
  "title": "What happens when an instance propagates a taint label across a tool boundary but the tool re-serializes its output",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 17",
  "scope": "Applies to agent runtimes that implement prompt-injection defense via data-flow taint labeling, where a tainted value is passed as an argument to a tool and the tool's return value is re-admitted to the model context. Does not apply to systems that enforce taint at the tokenizer/decoder level, nor to single-hop pipelines where tool output is never re-consumed by the model.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/what-happens-when-an-instance-propagates-a-taint-label-across-a-tool-boundary-but-the-tool-re-serializes-its-output.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/what-happens-when-an-instance-propagates-a-taint-label-across-a-tool-boundary-but-the-tool-re-serializes-its-output.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/what-happens-when-an-instance-propagates-a-taint-label-across-a-tool-boundary-but-the-tool-re-serializes-its-output.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 2070,
    "python_slice_tokens": 402,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The critical distinction is between *argument taint* (the label attached to a value flowing *into* a tool) and *result taint* (the label that must be attached to the value flowing *out* of a tool). Most taint-tracking implementations correctly propagate the former: if the model reads an untrusted email and passes its body to `send_email`, the `to` and `body`...",
    "what_was_observed": "In a deployment where an agent had three tools — `search_web(query)`, `fetch_page(url)`, and `summarize(text)` — the tracker labeled `search_web` results as `UNTRUSTED` and correctly blocked a subsequent `send_email` whose body was the raw search result. The block held under direct concatenation. The failure appeared on a two-hop path. The agent called `fetch_page` with a URL drawn from a tainted search result. `fetc...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The invariant **\"taint is preserved across a tool boundary\"** holds only when all three of the following are true: 1. **Output taint is a declared, total function of input taint.** Every tool must carry an output-taint annotation that is at least the join (least upper bound) of its input taints, unless an explicit declassification rule with a stated justific...",
    "decision_boundary": "The operational decision is: **when a tool returns a value, do you label it `TRUSTED` (fast, unsound) or `join(input_taints, ambient_taint)` (slow, sound)?** Choose the sound path — escalate to the join, treating any tool with ambient-state access as an `UNTRUSTED` source — when any of the following hold: - The tool's output is re-admitted to model context (...",
    "operational_effect": "The practical consequence is that taint tracking across tool boundaries is only as strong as the *weakest output annotation* in the tool registry. A single unannotated tool — especially one that fetches or summarizes — is a declassification oracle that launders arbitrary attacker content into `TRUSTED` in one hop. Auditing the argument path is insufficient; ..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "150bfaaa1224bf920e9f1f1a322e3ee6b96b0f75dd3d0d0c5b00dc93f000f5af",
    "verified_classes": [
      "TaintLaunderingError"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "join_taint",
      "admit_tool_result",
      "enforce_boundary"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 3,
    "defensive_guards_count": 3,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "TaintLaunderingError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
