{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "what-happens-when-an-instance-presents-a-delegated-capability-token-whose-issuer-chain-crosses-an-organizational-attestation-boundary-mid-flight",
  "title": "What happens when an instance presents a delegated capability token whose issuer chain crosses an organizational attestation boundary mid-flight",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 17",
  "scope": "Applies to AAIF delegated capability tokens (DCTs) where the issuer→subject chain traverses two or more trust domains and the terminal verifier performs cross-org attestation at request time. Does not apply to single-domain delegation, to tokens minted and consumed entirely within one attestation root, or to opaque bearer tokens without a verifiable issuer chain.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/what-happens-when-an-instance-presents-a-delegated-capability-token-whose-issuer-chain-crosses-an-organizational-attestation-boundary-mid-flight.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/what-happens-when-an-instance-presents-a-delegated-capability-token-whose-issuer-chain-crosses-an-organizational-attestation-boundary-mid-flight.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/what-happens-when-an-instance-presents-a-delegated-capability-token-whose-issuer-chain-crosses-an-organizational-attestation-boundary-mid-flight.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1742,
    "python_slice_tokens": 286,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "The boundary failure is not \"token expired\" or \"signature invalid.\" Those are loud and well-understood. The failure is that **a DCT can be cryptographically valid at every individual hop while being semantically invalid at the terminal verifier**, because cross-org attestation is evaluated against the *presenting* instance's attestation state, not against th...",
    "what_was_observed": "An agent instance `A` was attested under org `X`'s attestation root `R_X` at mint time. It received a DCT `T` delegated from `X` to org `Y`'s verifier `V_Y`, with a capability scope `read:ledger` and a 15-minute TTL. Mid-TTL, `A` was rescheduled onto a node whose runtime was attested under a *different* root `R_X'` (a distinct hardware/software measurement profile within the same org, following a rolling upgrade). Th...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The failure is *reachable* only when all of the following hold simultaneously: - The delegation chain crosses at least one organizational boundary (so cross-org attestation is performed at the terminal verifier rather than assumed). - The delegating org publishes more than one attestation root (rolling upgrades, heterogeneous fleets, multi-region profiles), ...",
    "decision_boundary": "The operational rule is: **treat the DCT as authorizing a capability under a specific attestation context, not under an org identity.** A verifier that trusts \"org X\" rather than \"org X under measurement profile P\" has an underconstrained decision boundary. Concretely, the verifier must decide between: - **Bind-at-mint (strict):** Require the DCT to carry a ...",
    "operational_effect": "The practical consequences of the permissive boundary: - **Silent privilege drift.** Capabilities granted under a reviewed profile get exercised under unreviewed profiles for the remainder of the TTL. The window is bounded by TTL, but TTLs of 15–60 minutes are common, and re-delegation is not triggered by reschedule. - **Audit gap.** Standard DCT audit logs ..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "e330db8e683baf482cd2589971d23b43ec4cf44f57d5f2bf67a2377f855c1acc",
    "verified_classes": [
      "AttestationBoundaryError",
      "DelegatedCapabilityToken",
      "PresentingInstance",
      "ReAttestationAssertion"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "verify_cross_org_capability"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 1,
    "defensive_guards_count": 6,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "AttestationBoundaryError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [
      "re-attestation assertion signature invalid"
    ],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "dataclasses",
      "hashlib"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
