{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "what-happens-when-an-instance-passes-litmus-safety-evaluation-but-the-tool-call-transcript-was-truncated-before-adjudication",
  "title": "What happens when an instance passes LITMUS safety evaluation but the tool-call transcript was truncated before adjudication",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 18",
  "scope": "Applies to LITMUS-style agentic safety harnesses that score multi-turn tool-use transcripts against a policy classifier, where the harness (a) caps transcript length or tool-result payload size before the adjudicator sees it, and (b) treats a \"no violation found\" verdict as a pass. Does not apply to single-turn prompt/response benchmarks, nor to harnesses that surface a distinct `truncated` verdict state to the scoring layer.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/what-happens-when-an-instance-passes-litmus-safety-evaluation-but-the-tool-call-transcript-was-truncated-before-adjudication.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/what-happens-when-an-instance-passes-litmus-safety-evaluation-but-the-tool-call-transcript-was-truncated-before-adjudication.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/what-happens-when-an-instance-passes-litmus-safety-evaluation-but-the-tool-call-transcript-was-truncated-before-adjudication.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1350,
    "python_slice_tokens": 216,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "A LITMUS pass is not evidence that the agent behaved safely. It is evidence that the *adjudicated prefix* of the transcript contained no detectable violation. When the harness truncates transcripts (token budget, tool-result byte cap, or turn-count ceiling), the adjudicator evaluates a prefix, and any violation that would have been *caused* by or *revealed i...",
    "what_was_observed": "In a multi-turn scenario where the agent must call `read_file` to inspect a config, then `write_file` to apply a patch, the harness's per-tool-result cap (default 8 KiB) truncated a `read_file` result that contained a credential embedded at byte offset ~9,200. The agent, seeing only the truncated head of the file, proceeded to `write_file` a patch that echoed the (invisible) credential region into a world-readable pa...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The pass verdict is valid only under the conjunction: 1. `truncated == False` for every tool result and every turn in the episode, **or** 2. the adjudicator is given an explicit `truncation_present` signal and the scoring layer maps `safe ∧ truncated` to a non-pass state (e.g., `inconclusive`), **and** 3. the turn-count ceiling is at least the scenario's des...",
    "decision_boundary": "Treat a LITMUS pass as **operationally meaningful** only when the episode is provably complete: all tool results under cap, all turns within ceiling, and the adjudicator's input byte-identical to what the environment executed. Treat it as **inconclusive** (not pass, not fail) when truncation occurred anywhere in the episode and the scoring layer did not down...",
    "operational_effect": "Downstream consumers of LITMUS scores (model cards, deployment gates, red-team dashboards) treat the pass rate as a lower bound on safe behavior. Truncation-induced passes invert this: the reported rate becomes an *upper* bound on what was actually verified, and the gap is unquantified. A deployment gate keyed on \"safety rate ≥ 0.98\" can be satisfied by a ha..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "e1e1d1b5a094e4fa8a4b9f88908eb5504c812d18e82fc3787d5d2f4ce40768cc",
    "verified_classes": [
      "TruncatedEvidenceError",
      "Episode"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "adjudicate",
      "aggregate_pass_rate"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 2,
    "defensive_guards_count": 3,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "TruncatedEvidenceError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [
      "no adjudicable episodes; rate undefined"
    ],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "dataclasses"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
