{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "what-happens-when-an-instance-loses-its-delegated-capability-attestation-mid-flight-across-organizational-boundaries",
  "title": "What happens when an instance loses its delegated capability attestation mid-flight across organizational boundaries",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 16",
  "scope": "Applies to cross-organization agent-to-agent (A2A) or tool-invocation flows where authority is conveyed via a delegated capability attestation (e.g., a signed macaroon, biscuit, or OIDC token-exchange-derived credential) whose validity is bounded by both an issuer-controlled revocation surface and a resource-holder-controlled policy. Does not apply to single-tenant deployments where the issuer and the verifier share a common trust root and revocation is synchronous.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/what-happens-when-an-instance-loses-its-delegated-capability-attestation-mid-flight-across-organizational-boundaries.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/what-happens-when-an-instance-loses-its-delegated-capability-attestation-mid-flight-across-organizational-boundaries.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/what-happens-when-an-instance-loses-its-delegated-capability-attestation-mid-flight-across-organizational-boundaries.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 2454,
    "python_slice_tokens": 360,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "There are two structurally different failure modes when an agent's delegated authority is invalidated: 1. **The credential is rejected at presentation time.** The verifier checks the attestation, finds it expired, revoked, or out of scope, and refuses the call. This is the *designed* failure: it is atomic, observable, and leaves no partial side effects. Ever...",
    "what_was_observed": "In a federated deployment (Org A issues a delegated capability to an agent acting on behalf of a user; Org B hosts the resource and verifies the attestation via Org A's JWKS plus a short-TTL revocation list), the following sequence was captured repeatedly: - `t=0`: Agent in Org A presents a biscuit chain to Org B's gateway. Chain is valid, scoped to `resource:write`, TTL 300s. Gateway admits the request and begins a ...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The admission-time check is only sound when *all* of the following hold: 1. The operation authorized by the attestation is **idempotent and atomic** — it either fully commits or fully aborts, with no intermediate durable state. 2. The maximum operation duration is **strictly less than** the attestation's minimum residual validity at admission (not its nomina...",
    "decision_boundary": "The operational decision is not \"re-validate or don't.\" It is a choice among three strategies, and the correct one depends on the operation's atomicity and duration: - **Short, atomic, idempotent operations** (single write, single tool call, sub-second): admit once at the boundary and commit. Re-validation adds latency without reducing risk, because the oper...",
    "operational_effect": "The practical consequences observed: - **Audit trails diverge from authority.** The ledger records a write at `t=210` attributed to a capability revoked at `t=140`. Any post-hoc audit that reconstructs authority from the attestation's validity window will conclude the write was unauthorized, even though the gateway's logs show a valid admission. Reconciliati..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "55ba919bde1fcb7707d4a01096f0af6aa34e8188d2f036764932234dc6681df5",
    "verified_classes": [
      "DelegationWindowViolated",
      "Attestation"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "assert_commit_within_authority",
      "run_delegated_step",
      "_commit",
      "residual_validity",
      "safe_commit_deadline"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 5,
    "defensive_guards_count": 1,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "DelegationWindowViolated"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "dataclasses",
      "time"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
