{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "what-happens-when-an-instance-is-revoked-in-one-aaif-trust-domain-but-its-delegated-capability-tokens-remain-valid-in-a-peer-domain",
  "title": "What happens when an instance is revoked in one AAIF trust domain but its delegated capability tokens remain valid in a peer domain",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 15",
  "scope": "Applies to federated agent deployments where instances hold short-lived delegated capability tokens issued *downstream* of an identity assertion, and where revocation propagates only through the identity layer (not the capability layer). Does not apply to single-domain deployments, nor to deployments where every capability token is bound at issuance time to a live, checkable identity revocation endpoint.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/what-happens-when-an-instance-is-revoked-in-one-aaif-trust-domain-but-its-delegated-capability-tokens-remain-valid-in-a-peer-domain.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/what-happens-when-an-instance-is-revoked-in-one-aaif-trust-domain-but-its-delegated-capability-tokens-remain-valid-in-a-peer-domain.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/what-happens-when-an-instance-is-revoked-in-one-aaif-trust-domain-but-its-delegated-capability-tokens-remain-valid-in-a-peer-domain.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1714,
    "python_slice_tokens": 345,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "There are two distinct things an agent \"is\" in a federated AAIF topology: an **identity** (a subject with a lifecycle — provisioned, attested, revoked) and a **capability** (a signed grant that authorizes a specific action on a specific resource until an expiry). These are managed by different planes. Revocation is an identity-plane operation. Capability val...",
    "what_was_observed": "A compromised agent instance in Domain A was detected and revoked at 14:02. The revocation propagated correctly: the instance could no longer authenticate to Domain A, its refresh tokens were invalidated, and its session was terminated. By 14:05 the operator considered the incident contained. However, between 13:40 and 14:02 the instance had used its Domain A identity to obtain a delegation from a resource owner, and...",
    "condition_of_validity": "This boundary is *live* — meaning the failure is reachable — only when all of the following hold: 1. Capability tokens are issued by a domain **other than** the one that holds the subject's authoritative identity record. 2. Those tokens are validated by signature and expiry alone, without a live or near-live check against the subject's revocation status in t...",
    "decision_boundary": "The operational question is not \"did revocation succeed?\" but \"what is the maximum residual validity window across all peer domains?\" That is: If `residual_window > 0`, revocation is *advisory* in that domain, not enforced. The decision boundary is whether you treat that window as acceptable risk or as an incident that is still open. The trap is treating a s...",
    "operational_effect": "When this boundary is unmanaged, revocation becomes a best-effort signal that leaks authority into peer domains for the duration of the longest outstanding token. The practical consequences are: incident response that reports \"contained\" while the attacker retains working credentials; audit reconciliation that requires correlating two domains' logs by subjec..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "c7e5d09523f71901bebbafaf414f1d6ad60f66984b09d64cbca424673243255b",
    "verified_classes": [
      "ResidualAuthorityError",
      "CapabilityToken"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "assert_revocation_contained",
      "expires_at"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 2,
    "defensive_guards_count": 1,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "ResidualAuthorityError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "dataclasses",
      "time"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
