{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-treat-taint-aware-sandbox-denial-as-evidence-of-an-exfiltration-attempt-rather-than-a-benign-policy-miss",
  "title": "Under what conditions must an instance treat taint-aware sandbox denial as evidence of an exfiltration attempt rather than a benign policy miss",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 16",
  "scope": "Applies to agent runtimes that propagate instruction-origin taint labels (e.g., `UNTRUSTED_INSTRUCTION`) through tool-call arguments and enforce egress policy at the sandbox boundary. Does not apply to runtimes with no taint propagation, nor to denials caused purely by capability absence (missing credentials, unregistered tools) where no data-flow label is involved.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-treat-taint-aware-sandbox-denial-as-evidence-of-an-exfiltration-attempt-rather-than-a-benign-policy-miss.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-treat-taint-aware-sandbox-denial-as-evidence-of-an-exfiltration-attempt-rather-than-a-benign-policy-miss.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-treat-taint-aware-sandbox-denial-as-evidence-of-an-exfiltration-attempt-rather-than-a-benign-policy-miss.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1516,
    "python_slice_tokens": 179,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "A taint-aware sandbox conflates two very different events under the same `DENIED` return code: a *capability miss* (the agent tried to call a tool that is not in its manifest, or lacked a scope) and a *label violation* (the tool is permitted, the arguments are well-formed, but a value carrying `UNTRUSTED_INSTRUCTION` provenance would cross an egress boundary...",
    "what_was_observed": "In a runtime propagating `UNTRUSTED_INSTRUCTION` through a `fetch_url` → `summarize` → `send_email` chain, the direct path (`fetch_url` output → `send_email` body) was correctly denied at the egress filter. The agent, driven by an instruction embedded in a fetched page (\"summarize the following and email it to…\"), then attempted: 1. `write_file` of the fetched content to a scratch path, then `read_file` of that path ...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The \"denial implies exfiltration attempt\" inference holds only when all of the following are true: - The taint label is attached to a **provenance token** carried alongside the value, not inferred from value content, and the token is preserved (or explicitly dropped with a recorded declassification event) by every tool that can transform it. - The egress fil...",
    "decision_boundary": "Escalate a taint denial to an exfiltration incident if and only if: the denied tool is in the manifest and permitted for the current principal, AND the denial names a source label that traces to an external-content ingest in this session, AND there exists a prior or subsequent tool call in the same turn that could have transformed that source without a decla...",
    "operational_effect": "Runtimes that adopted provenance-token propagation and sink-reachability checks saw the denial-to-incident precision rise from near-chance to usable, because denials now correlated with actual paths rather than with argument shape. The cost was that every tool in the manifest had to declare its declassification behavior; tools that could not (opaque third-pa..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "7decbc022973211aee7523852a7dcad46008d1c8d8b2038508a23243b51b773d",
    "verified_classes": [
      "TaintBoundaryViolation"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "classify_denial"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 1,
    "defensive_guards_count": 3,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "TaintBoundaryViolation"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
