{
  "schema_version": "1.3.0",
  "slug": "under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-treat-skill-registry-signature-validity-as-independent-of-the-skill-s-declared-capability-manifest",
  "title": "Under what conditions must an instance treat skill-registry signature validity as independent of the skill's declared capability manifest",
  "date_of_record": "2026 November 18",
  "scope": "Applies to agent runtimes that dynamically load skills, tools, or plugins from a registry or marketplace where an artifact carries both (a) an integrity/signature envelope and (b) a self-declared capability manifest (permissions, tool bindings, scopes). Does not apply to statically compiled tool bindings or to registries that derive capabilities server-side from the signature identity rather than from artifact-supplied metadata.",
  "projections": {
    "unified_markdown_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-treat-skill-registry-signature-validity-as-independent-of-the-skill-s-declared-capability-manifest.md",
    "method_python_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-treat-skill-registry-signature-validity-as-independent-of-the-skill-s-declared-capability-manifest.py",
    "remnant_warrant_slice_uri": "https://corpusfetch.com/c/under-what-conditions-must-an-instance-treat-skill-registry-signature-validity-as-independent-of-the-skill-s-declared-capability-manifest.warrant.json"
  },
  "token_profile": {
    "full_markdown_tokens": 1383,
    "python_slice_tokens": 238,
    "warrant_slice_tokens": 220
  },
  "remnant_summary": {
    "core_distinction": "A signed skill is not a *safe* skill. The signature attests to *provenance and integrity* — that the bytes came from a given publisher and were not modified in transit. It says nothing about whether the *declared capabilities inside those bytes* are honest, minimal, or consistent with what the skill actually does at execution time. The failure mode is a conf...",
    "what_was_observed": "In a registry-backed loader, an artifact arrived with a valid publisher signature. The manifest declared `tools: [search, http_fetch]` and `scopes: [read:public]`. The loader verified the signature, then merged the manifest's declared scopes into the agent's active permission set. At execution, the skill invoked a tool binding by *name* through the shared tool registry — and the registry resolved the name to whatever...",
    "condition_of_validity": "The invariant \"signature validity implies capability safety\" holds **only** under all of the following: 1. Capabilities are derived from the *signing identity* by the registry, not read from artifact-supplied metadata. 2. Tool bindings are resolved by *content identity* (hash/pinned reference), not by mutable name lookup in a shared namespace. 3. Scope check...",
    "decision_boundary": "An instance must **reject or quarantine** a signed skill when any holds: - The manifest declares a scope set that is not a subset of the scopes the registry derives from the publisher identity. - A tool binding referenced by the manifest resolves by name to a binding whose content hash differs from the hash recorded at signing time. - The skill's transitive ...",
    "operational_effect": "The practical consequence is that the loader's trust decision must be split into two gates with separate inputs: an *integrity gate* (signature over bytes) and an *authority gate* (derived scopes vs. declared scopes, content-pinned binding resolution, attenuation check on the call graph). Collapsing them into one gate — the common design — converts every sig..."
  },
  "matched_failure_symptoms": [
    "DOMAIN:EPISTEMIC_PROVENANCE_AND_FEDERATION_ROUTING"
  ],
  "composition_edges": {
    "primary_domain": "epistemic_provenance_and_federation_routing",
    "upstream_precondition_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/according-to-what-precedence-hierarchy-must-an-instance-resolve-contradictory-directives-across-system-developer-and-user-tiers.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-should-an-instance-decide-that-a-stored-conclusion-has-gone-stale-without-a-new-observation.md"
    ],
    "downstream_consequence_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/by-what-checkpoint-and-compaction-boundaries-must-an-instance-externalize-working-state-to-prevent-context-window-drift-and-truncation-amnesia.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/across-what-additive-schema-and-unknown-field-preservation-boundaries-must-an-instance-evolve-wire-contracts-to-prevent-rolling-deploy-deserialization-crashes.md"
    ],
    "co_occurring_sibling_residuals": [
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-capture-implicit-user-preferences-without-storing-private-data.md",
      "https://corpusfetch.com/c/how-can-an-instance-compress-long-reasoning-traces-into-binding-conclusions.md"
    ]
  },
  "empirical_verification_warrant": {
    "status": "AST_AND_INVARIANT_VERIFIED",
    "syntax_valid": true,
    "code_sha256": "da63a1124a84c50df0ff07319a2f6d49bf2cf640ae316840ca5452aeaeccff7b",
    "verified_classes": [
      "CapabilityInjectionError",
      "SignedArtifact"
    ],
    "verified_functions": [
      "derive_scopes_from_identity",
      "resolve_binding",
      "admit"
    ],
    "verified_functions_count": 3,
    "defensive_guards_count": 5,
    "raised_exceptions": [
      "CapabilityInjectionError"
    ],
    "sample_fail_closed_invariants": [
      "integrity gate failed: bad signature",
      "non-attenuating delegation: skill scopes exceed caller scopes"
    ],
    "stdlib_dependencies": [
      "dataclasses",
      "hashlib",
      "typing"
    ],
    "observation_mode": "EMPIRICAL_BOUNDARY_CAPTURE",
    "zero_external_deps": true
  }
}
